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ABSTRACT
Stanley, Dannie M. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2013. Improved Kernel Security Through Code Validation, Diversification, and Minimization. Major Professors:
Eugene H. Spafford and Dongyan Xu.
The vast majority of hosts on the Internet, including mobile clients, are running
one of three commodity, general-purpose operating system families. In such operating
systems the kernel software executes at the highest processor privilege level. If an
adversary is able to hijack the kernel software then by extension he has full control
of the system. This control includes the ability to disable protection mechanisms and
hide evidence of compromise.
The lack of diversity in commodity, general-purpose operating systems enables
attackers to craft a single kernel exploit that has the potential to infect millions of
hosts. If enough variants of the vulnerable software exist, then mass exploitation is
much more difficult to achieve. We introduce novel kernel diversification techniques
to improve kernel security.
Many modern kernels are self-patching; they modify themselves at run-time. Selfpatching kernels must therefore allow kernel code to be modified at run-time. To
prevent code injection attacks, some operating systems and security mechanisms enforce a W ⊕ X memory protection policy for kernel code. This protection policy
prevents self-patching kernels from applying patches at run-time. We introduce a
novel run-time kernel instruction-level validation technique to validate the integrity
of patches at run-time.
Kernels shipped with general-purpose operating systems often contain extraneous
code. The code may contain exploitable vulnerabilities or may be pieced together
using return/jump-oriented programming to attack the system. Code-injection pre-

x
vention techniques do not prevent such attacks. We introduce a novel run-time kernel
minimization technique to improve kernel security.
We show that it is possible to strengthen the defenses of commodity generalpurpose computer operating systems by increasing the diversity of, validating the
integrity of, and ensuring the minimality of the included kernel components without
modifying the kernel source code. Such protections can therefore be added to existing widely-used unmodified operating systems to prevent malicious software from
executing in supervisor mode.

1

1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The vast majority of hosts on the Internet, including mobile clients, are running
one of three commodity, general-purpose operating system families. In such operating systems the kernel software executes at the highest processor privilege level and
therefore has full control of the system. If an adversary is able to hijack the kernel
software then by extension he has full control of the system. This control includes
the ability to disable protection mechanisms and hide evidence of compromise. Attackers may exploit flaws in software to subjugate the kernel using a variety of attack
techniques, including buffer overflows [1], return-oriented programming [2, 3], heap
overflows [4], format string vulnerabilities [5], and integer overflows [6, 7].
Malicious operating system kernel software, such as the code introduced by a
kernel rootkit, is strongly dependent on the organization of the victim operating system. The lack of diversity in commodity, general-purpose operating systems enables
attackers to craft a single kernel exploit that has the potential to infect millions of
hosts. If the underlying structure of vulnerable operating system components has
been changed in an unpredictable manner, then attackers must create many unique
variations of their exploit to attack vulnerable systems en masse. If enough variants of
the vulnerable software exist, then mass exploitation is much more difficult to achieve.
Therefore, diversification can be used to improve the security of an operating system
kernel.
Security mechanisms have been created to prevent kernel rootkit code injection
by authenticating all code that is loaded into kernel space. Modern self-patching
kernels modify kernel code in-memory at run-time at instruction-level granularity. If
the kernel code was validated at load-time and modified later at run-time, then the

2
code is no longer guaranteed authentic. Instruction-level run-time validation can be
used to improve the security of an operating system kernel.
Kernels shipped with general-purpose operating systems often contain extraneous code. The unnecessary kernel code is a security liability. The code may contain exploitable vulnerabilities or may be pieced together using return/jump-oriented
programming to attack the system. Run-time kernel minimization can be used to
improve the security of an operating system kernel.
Our hypothesis is the following: It is possible to strengthen the defenses of commodity, general-purpose computer operating systems by increasing the diversity of,
validating the integrity of, and ensuring the minimality of the included kernel components without modifying the kernel source code. Such protections can therefore
be added to existing, widely-used, unmodified operating systems to prevent malicious
software from executing in supervisor mode.
To test our hypothesis we design and implement six distinct kernel security mechanisms, protect many unmodified commodity operating systems kernels using the
mechanisms, and assail the protected kernels using common attack techniques including return-oriented programming and kernel rootkits.

1.2 Contributions
1.2.1 Diversification
Many forms of automatic software diversification have been explored and found
to be useful for preventing malicious software infection. Forrest et. al. make a strong
case for software diversity and describe a few possible techniques including adding
or removing nonfunctional code, reordering code, and reordering memory layouts [8].
Our diversification techniques build on the latter.
We describe the design and implementation of two novel kernel diversification
mechanisms that mutate an operating system kernel using memory layout randomization. We introduce a new method for randomizing the stack layout of function

3
arguments and refine a previous technique for record layout randomization by introducing a static analysis technique for determining the randomizability of a record.
We developed prototypes of our kernel diversification mechanisms using the plugin architecture offered by GCC. To test the security benefits of our techniques, we
randomized multiple Linux kernels using our compiler plugins. We attacked the randomized kernels using multiple kernel rootkits. We show that by strategically selecting just a few components for randomization, our techniques prevent kernel rootkit
infection.

1.2.2 Validation
Previous works in code injection prevention use cryptographic hashes to validate
the integrity of kernel code at load-time. The hash creation and validation procedure
depends on immutable kernel code. However, some modern kernels contain selfpatching kernel code [9]; they may overwrite executable instructions in memory after
load-time. Such dynamic patching may occur for a variety of reason including CPU
optimizations, multiprocessor compatibility adjustments, and advanced debugging.
Previous hash-based validation procedures cannot handle such modifications.
We describe the design and implementation of a novel kernel validation mechanism
that validates the integrity of each modified instruction as it is introduced into the
guest kernel.
We developed prototypes of our kernel validation mechanism by customizing the
Linux KVM hypervisor and performed instruction-level validation of a guest selfpatching Linux kernel. Our experiments show that our system can correctly detect
and validate all valid instruction modifications and reject all invalid ones in support
of a new code-injection prevention system named NICKLE-KVM.

4
1.2.3 Minimization
Previous work has been done in additive operating system specialization [10]. An
example of such specialization is loadable kernel modules, such as drivers, that add
kernel code at runtime. However, work has not been done in subtractive operating
system specialization.
We describe the design and implementation of two novel run-time kernel minimization mechanisms. The first is an out-of-the-box function eviction technique. The
second is a kernel-based non-executable page technique.
We developed prototypes of our kernel minimization mechanism by customizing
the Linux KVM hypervisor and performed run-time kernel minimization on a guest
Linux kernel. Our experiments show that it is possible to improve the security of
a kernel against return and jump oriented programming attacks by deactivating extraneous kernel code at run-time thereby limiting the supply of reusable instructions
that can be used to construct return-oriented gadgets.

1.3 Terminology
Commodity General-Purpose Operating Systems Operating systems that are
commonly used with desktop, laptop, and server-class hardware including the
following families of operating system: Linux, Windows, and Mac OS X. This
class of operating system excludes specialized operating systems used for embedded devices and mobile computing.

1.4 Models
1.4.1 Computation Model
Our computation model follows the Von Neumann architecture described by [11],
used by many modern architectures [12–14], and illustrated in Figure 1.1. The computation model has four primary components: the control unit (CU), the arithmetic

5

Memory

Input

Control Unit

Arithmetic and Logic
Unit
Accumulator

Output

Figure 1.1. Computation model

and logic unit (ALU), accumulator that manages input/output operations, and memory. The CU has many registers including one used as the program counter (PC) that
are used to fetch and execute instructions as described in Section 1.4.2. The address
of the next instruction to be executed is stored in the PC. The memory holds both
code and data as described in Section 1.4.3. This model of computation is sometimes
referred to as the “Princeton” architecture in contrast to the “Harvard” architecture that has distinct physically separate memory for code and data. The ALU is
responsible for performing arithmetic and logical calculations.
Further we assume a linearly addressed hardware-assisted paged virtual memory
system with a memory management unit (MMU). A special processor control register1
holds the memory address of the page directory base register (PDBR). The PDBR
address is the entry point for the page table associated with the current task. Upon a
context switch the PDBR may be updated giving each task its own linearly addressed
virtual memory space. The MMU also utilizes a translation look-aside buffer2 (TLB).
We assume that the TLB is flushed when the PDBR is updated. Further in our model,
virtual memory pages have read-write-execute access control attributes that can be
used for page-level protections.
1
2

CR3 for x86
for simplicity a unified TLB is assumed though some modern processors have multiple TLBs
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1.4.2 Execution Model

Start
MAR ← PC
PC ← PC + 1

Fecth
Decode

IR ← M[MAR]
Decode IR

Jump?

Execute

Y

PC ← Jump Addr.

Execute IR

Result?

Y

Store Result

Interrupt?

Y

PC ← ISR Addr.

Figure 1.2. Execution model

Our execution model follows the fetch-decode-execute design described by [15],
used by many modern architectures [12–14], and illustrated in Figure 1.2. The execution model has three phases during one clock cycle: fetch, decode, and execute.
The PC holds the memory address of the next executable instruction. At startup,
the CPU sets an initial PC value. The CPU copies the PC value to the memory
address register (MAR) and advances the PC to the next instruction. Then the CU
fetches the instruction from memory (M[]), using the address stored in MAR, into
the instruction register (IR). Then the CU decodes the instruction into its component
parts including the operation and operands. If the operation is a jump, then the PC
is updated and the execution continues. Otherwise the ALU executes the instruction
and stores the result if one is emitted. If the interrupt request register (IRR) holds
a pending interrupt, the programmable interrupt controller (PIC) copies the address
of the corresponding interrupt service routine (ISR) to the PC.
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For our model, we assume a single processing core running in a multitasking
operating system. As a result, only one instruction is executed at a time and the
operating system performs frequent context switches. The processor has at least two
privilege modes that we refer to as kernel mode and user mode. Privileged instructions
are only executed in kernel mode. Examples of such instructions includes: loading
the interrupt descriptor table and changing the current privilege level. None of the
techniques describe depend upon a specific task scheduling technique, instruction
pipelining, instruction caching, or multi-core processing. Therefore, these components
are not pertinent to our execution model.

1.4.3 Process Memory Model

kernel space
Kernel

Stack ↓

Memory Mapped Files (shared libs)

user space
Heap ↑
BSS (Uninitialized Global/Static Variables)
Data (Initialized Global/Static Variables)
Text (User Program Code)

Figure 1.3. Task memory model

Our process memory model follows the memory layout used by many current
commodity operating systems3 , and illustrated in Figure 1.3. The user program code
3

Linux, Windows, and Mac OS
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is loaded at the bottom of the process virtual address space. Dynamic user memory
is allocated on the user heap (heap) adjacent to the user program, and it grows
from a lower numerical memory address to a higher numerical memory address. The
stack is located adjacent to the kernel space, described next, and grows from a higher
numerical memory address to a lower numerical memory address. Shared libraries and
other special files are mapped into a region of memory between the heap and the stack.
These regions of memory are referred to collectively as “user space.” A predetermined
fixed amount of memory is allocated for the operating system “kernel space” at the
top of the task address range. The kernel program is loaded at the bottom of the
kernel space. Dynamic kernel memory is allocated as needed in available kernel space.
Though the operating system may have one or more kernel stacks, unless otherwise
noted the term “stack” refers to the user stack.
Generally, we rely on the stack-based calling convention design described in [16].
Specifically, the function calling convention used, unless otherwise noted, is the x86
CDECL calling convention described by Kernighan and Ritchie [17]. This calling
convention is the default for current popular x86 C compilers4 . This specific calling
convention, though implementation specific, is germane to the attack and protection
techniques described herein because of assumptions made about the layout of the
stack during run-time.
In the CDECL calling convention, the calling function pushes the arguments for
the callee function onto the stack in reversed order and then calls the callee function.
When the call instruction is executed the current PC is pushed onto the stack, this
memory address value is referred to as the “return address.” The callee pushes the
stack base pointer (BP) onto the stack and stores the current stack pointer (SP) as the
new BP. The SP always holds the address of the top of the stack. The values resident
in any of the registers that are needed by the function are pushed onto the stack.
Then the callee allocates space for local, non-static, function variables on the stack
by advancing the SP address proportional to the amount of space needed by local
4

GNU GCC 4.7.2 and Microsoft Visual Studio 2012
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...
argument n
...
pushed by
caller

argument 2
argument 1
return address
saved BP of caller

BP of
callee

callee saved register 1
callee saved register 2

stack

...
pushed by
callee

callee saved register n
local variable 1
local variable 2
...

SP

local variable n

Figure 1.4. Call stack model

variables. Figure 1.4 illustrates the layout of the stack after a call has been made. The
callee is responsible for restoring the callee saved registers before returning. When a
return instruction is reached, the return address is popped off the top of the stack
into the PC.
Many of the techniques described are not necessarily dependent on this task memory model and have analogues in other platforms and calling conventions. However,
for the sake of clarity and harmony with related works, we provide examples using
these conventions.
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1.4.4 Threat Model
For our work we assume that an attacker can communicate with the vulnerable
system through a network interface controller (NIC); that the system has a hardware
or software vulnerability that is exploitable through NIC communications, such as a
system service buffer overflow vulnerability; that the attacker is able to write to some
region of memory, such as the user stack; and that the attacker is able to manipulate
the PC either directly or indirectly. We assume that the operating system attempts
to enforce contemporary protection mechanisms such as those listed in Section 2.2.
Specifically, we assume that kernel code pages are read-only but kernel data pages
are writeable and non-executable as implemented by the kernel or by VMM based
solutions such as NICKLE [18].
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2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Attack Techniques
The operating system kernel may be subverted using a variety of attack techniques.
One of the primary types of attacks is referred to as control-flow hijacking. In this
type of attack, the control flow of a running program is diverted to an unintended
segment of code. This is accomplished by modifying an address that is stored in
memory and will be later used by a control flow instruction such as a jump, call or
return instruction. For example, in the x86 architecture, when a “ret” instruction
is encountered, an address is popped off the stack into the program counter. This
address is referred to as the “return address.” As a result, the next instructions
executed by the processor will be fetched from the memory region starting at the
return address. Similarly, if a program makes a call to an address stored in data
memory, such is the case when function pointers are used, and that address can be
modified by an attacker, then the control flow may be subverted.
In this section we discuss the various methods used to leverage a control-flow
type of attack. For each attack, the naive approach is described. In some cases
mitigation techniques have been adopted that require the attack technique to be
more sophisticated than the one presented. Mitigation techniques are described in
Section 2.2.

2.1.1 Buffer Overflow Attack
Buffer overflow attacks are well studied but have “been remarkably resistant to
elimination” [19]. Attackers have used buffer overflows in combination with other
techniques, as we describe later, to hijack the control flow of a program and execute
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malicious code. Buffer overflow attacks can take place on the memory stack or the
memory heap. Following is a description of both kinds of buffer overflow attacks and
how they can lead to control-flow hijacking.

Stack-Based Buffer Overflow Attack
A piece of software is vulnerable to a stack-based buffer overflow attack if the
boundaries of a buffer in memory allocated on the stack, such as a variable representing an array, are not checked and enforced when the buffer is filled. For example,
a programmer may designate a local variable of the size 32 bytes. When the procedure holding this local variable is executed, the function preamble allocates a chunk
of memory on the stack for this variable in the size of 32 bytes. If during program
execution another buffer, larger than 32 bytes, is copied into this local variable then
the space on the stack allocated for this variable is overflowed.
The ramifications of an overflow event may not be immediately apparent. The
problem arises when the areas of memory adjacent to the buffer, such as other local variables, get overflowed into. Now those variables have values that were not
intentionally set by the programmer.
In an execution model where the return address is stored on the stack and the stack
grows downward, the top of the stack is at a lower numerical address, the function
return address is at a higher numerical address than the local variable holding the
buffer. As a result, a carefully crafted overflow event can modify the return address
of the function. When the function concludes, the control flow jumps to the return
address stored on the stack even if address has been malicious manipulated. This
kind of attack is often referred to as “stack smashing” [1]. This technique was used
by the first Internet worm described by Spafford in 1989 [20].
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Heap-Based Buffer Overflow Attack
Similar to the stack-based buffer overflow attack, a piece of software is vulnerable
to a heap-based buffer overflow attack if the boundaries of a buffer in memory allocated on the heap are not checked and enforced when the buffer is filled. Generally, a
heap-based buffer overflow attack can be used to write arbitrary data into arbitrary
locations in memory. As a result, a heap based overflow attack, could also modify
the return address stored on the stack.
Similar to the stack-based attack the key to the heap-based attack is what gets
written into memory when the buffer is overflowed. Most of the buffer overflow
attacks that can be leveraged on the stack can also be leveraged on the heap. However, the heap does have a characteristic that distinguishes it from the stack-based
vulnerabilities. When memory is allocated on the heap, bookkeeping information
about the allocation itself is often stored alongside the memory chunks being allocated. Therefore, when an overflow event occurs, the bookkeeping information may
get manipulated. Suppose for example, that the bookkeeping information contains
linked-list like pointers to the next and previous blocks of allocated memory. When
a block of memory is deallocated the bookkeeping information stored on adjacent
linked list nodes is updated. Depending on the specific implementation of the allocation routines, the update can be be tricked into writing a value from the next pointer,
e.g. a new return address, into an address pointed to by the previous pointer, e.g.
the location of the existing return address [4]. Other heap overflow techniques focus
on manipulating data stored in the heap, such as function pointers, to hijack control flow. Modifying a function pointer is not as general of a technique as modifying
the return address because it is heavily dependent on the organization of the data
structures used by the program.
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2.1.2 Format String Attack
A piece of software is vulnerable to a format string attack if the format parameter
to any of the functions in the “printf” family of library function can be provided by
the attacker [5]. There are two important attributes of the format string functions
that make this attack possible. First, the number of parameters passed into the
printf functions is variable. Second, the formatting character sequence “%n” in the
format string writes the number of outputted bytes to the corresponding integer
pointer also provided as a parameter. Because the number of parameters are variable,
the printf functions pop values off the stack to satisfy the formatting string. For
example, if the formatting string contains placeholders for 10 integers, then 10 integers
are popped off the stack. Even if 10 integers are not provided to the function, 10
integers are still popped off the stack. If one of the placeholders is a “%n”, then
the corresponding integer popped off the stack is treated as an integer pointer and it
receives the count value. The count value can be artificially incremented using special
formatting parameters. The count value can therefore be set to any integer value, for
example a memory address. The destination of the write is determined by the value
popped off the stack. The format string itself is stored on the stack. As a result, if
the prefix of the format string is a sequence of non-null bytes, they can be interpreted
as an integer, for example the address of the return address. As a result, any integer
can be written to any memory address if the attacker is able to control the format
string parameter.

2.1.3 Integer Overflow Attack
Unlike the previous attacks, integer overflow attacks do not themselves lead to
control-flow hijacking. Instead they are used in combination with buffer overflow
attacks. An integer overflow occurs when a value is stored in a variable of insufficient
size. This can happen as a result of a calculation. For example, adding two large
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integers together may result in a number that is larger than the largest possible
integer. Therefore, the sum should not be stored in an integer variable.
This can also happen as a result of a condition called “integer promotion.” When
a calculation involves variables of two different sizes, then the smaller variable is
promoted to the size of the larger variable, then demoted at the conclusion of the
calculation. In both cases, the value stored in a variable that has been overflowed, is
unintentionally allowed by the programmer.
Both overflow and integer promotion may lead to logic problems later in the
code. For example, the overflowed variable may be used to check the boundaries of a
buffer. If an attacker can force an integer overflow, he may be able to cause a buffer
overflow [6, 7].

2.1.4 Return and Jump-Oriented Programming
The attacks previously mentioned all hijack the control-flow of a program. Generally they overwrite some area of memory that holds an address such as the return
address on the stack. At some point during program execution, that address is used
as the target of a jump, call or return instruction. At the location of the target
memory address is a sequence of instructions that represent the attack code.
The attack code can be injected using one of the previous attack techniques, for
example a buffer overflow. However, various mitigation strategies, as described in
Section 2.2 have been introduced to prevent the injection of code into executable
regions of memory or to prevent the execution of writable area of memory such as the
regions occupied by heap and the stack. As a result, a different kind of attack evolved
that reuses portions of existing authorized code, such as kernel and system libraries, in
unconventional combinations to carry out the attack rather than injecting new code.
These kinds of attacks are generally referred to as “return-oriented programming”
attacks. Following is a description of such attacks.

16
Return-Into-Libc Attack
A return-into-libc attack was first described in 1997 as a proof-of-concept attack
against a system with a non-executable stack [21]. If an attacker can write data to the
stack, by using a buffer overflow for example, the stack can be strategically crafted
so that the program execution jumps into a shared library function. The function
executes exactly as if it had been called conventionally including popping function
parameters off the stack1 . Therefore, both the function and function parameters can
be provided by the attacker.
By way of an example, the attack described in [21] calculates the memory address
of the system library function named “system()” and the memory address of the string
“/bin/sh” that represents the path to a shell program. The attacker carefully crafts
a buffer that will exploit a known buffer overflow vulnerability in a system service
named lpr. The exploit overwrites the stack in such a way that the string “/bin/sh”
is passed to the library function “system().” The end result is that a shell is created.
Because the software exploited runs under the root user identifier, zero, the new shell
also runs under the root user identifier. Anyone with access to this root shell has full
control of the system.
The primary characteristic that distinguishes this kind of attack from the other
return-oriented techniques listed later is that it uses a system library function in its
entirety to carry out a malicious objective opposed to many smaller pieces of existing
authorized system code. Later in 2001, this technique was extended to include the
execution of multiple functions [22].

Return-Oriented Programming
In 2005, Krahmer introduced a method that resembles a return-into-libc attack but
instead of calling library functions his method borrows “chunks of code” from library
functions [2]. He demonstrates how to chain together many chunks of code to carry
1

CDECL calling convention
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out useful tasks. In 2007, Schacham generalized the technique and coined the term
return-oriented programming (ROP) [3]. Schacham refers to a combination of code
chunks as a gadget. Like the return-into-libc attack, a return-oriented programming
attack is based on stack manipulation. However, rather than attempting to change a
single address on the stack, for example the return address as in previous examples,
the attacker attempts to place multiple address and other values on the stack.
20
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c

Action
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PC ← b
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d
c
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mov

%edx,%eax

adder
gadget

EAX ← 20 + 10
PC ← d

Figure 2.1. Return-oriented adder gadget

Unlike the return-into-libc attack, the addresses are not location of functions in
memory, rather locations of segments of code that perform some useful computation
and occur just before a return instruction. After the computation is complete another
return instruction is encountered that causes the next return address to be popped
off the stack and execution continues to the next useful chunk of code. Figure 2.1
illustrates an “adder gadget.” The purpose of this gadget is to add two arbitrary
integers that are stored in the stack area of memory. The stack is represented on the
left and it has already been populated with values strategically by the attacker. The
variables a through d represent the starting addresses of four distinct non-contiguous
chunks of code. The resulting sum is stored in a register that could be then used by
successive gadgets.
The computations may pop values from the stack or use values in registers. Therefore, along with return addresses, the stack is filled strategically with values to be
used in the computations. For example, if the top of the stack holds the address of
an instruction that pops the value off the stack into a register and the next value on
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the stack is an integer value, then when the return instruction is reached the register has the value from the stack that can be used for the next computation. Many
computation-return combinations are strung together to create “gadgets.” Shacham
shows that enough gadgets can be assembled out of the standard C library to make
the technique turing-complete on the x86 architecture.

Jump-Oriented Programming
Jump oriented programming (JOR) is similar to to ROP. It reuses chunks of code
contained in libraries to carry out an attack. However, rather than reusing chunks
of code that end with return statements, JOP reuses chunks of code that end with
jump statements [23]. In ROP, the return statement pops the target address off the
stack. In JOP, the jump statement obtains its target address from a register.
At the JOP gadget’s jump target address is a carefully selected chunk of code that
represents the “dispatcher gadget.” Only one dispatcher gadget is needed and it is
reused as the glue that chains together the other JOP gadgets. The dispatcher gadget
has the following two characteristics: First it has a statement that modifies a value
in some “predictable” and “evolving” way. A simple example of such modification
would be an increment operation. Then the value that has been modified is the target
of a jump.
The dispatcher gadget iterates over a dispatch table. In the dispatch table is a
list of JOP gadget addresses. The dispatch table does not have to be in executable
memory, it can be stored anywhere in memory. The dispatcher table must store values
in a way that complements the dispatcher gadget. For example, if the dispatcher
gadget increments its value by four bytes, then the dispatcher table must store JOP
gadget starting addresses at four byte intervals. As a result, the dispatch gadget
becomes a kind of program counter for stringing together JOP gadgets.
Bletsch et. al. show that jump-oriented programming is just as expressive as
return-oriented programming. JOP however, is more complex and more difficult to
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construct. However, it has the benefits of not relying on the stack and is able to evade
many ROP detection and prevention mechanisms.

2.2 Mitigation Techniques
Many of the vulnerabilities that lead to exploitation can be remedied by the
software programmer. In the absence of bug-free code however, system developers
have developed several techniques to prevent, detect, or resist some of the attacks
previously described. In this section we discuss such techniques.

2.2.1 Hardware Fault Isolation
In 1968, Dijkstra described the hierarchical division of a computing system into
six levels of responsibilities [24]. Software executing in level 0 of the system hierarchy
manages the scheduling of tasks and provides a processor abstraction to software executing at higher-level layers. Software executing in levels 1-3 of the system hierarchy
manages other computing resources such as memory and input/output devices. The
operator, referred to in the model as responsibility level 5, executes programs in level
4. Because software executing in level 0 controls access to the processor, it has a
higher privilege level than software running in level 1; similarly, software running in
level 1 has a higher privilege level than software running in level 2, and so on.
Later, in 1972, Schroeder and Saltzer introduced the design of hardware-based
“privilege rings” to support privilege separation for the MULTICS operating system
[25]. Similar to the hierarchy suggested by Dijkstra, the ring with the highest privilege
level is referred to as “ring 0” and higher level rings have decreasing privileges. Rings
with more privileges include all of the capabilities of and access to the memory of
the lower privilege rings. Access from a lower privileged ring upward is mediated by
a well defined set of functions. These functions are generally referred to as “system
calls.” This separation of privilege is referred to as hardware fault isolation (HFI).
The faults that occur in lower privilege rings are isolated, by the hardware, from
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disturbing software executing at a higher privilege level. This separation is a coursegrained realization of the principle of “least privilege” that states “every user of the
system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job”
and “limits the damage that can result from an accident or error” [26].
Many modern computer processors, such as those found in personal computers,
include support for privilege rings or modes [12, 13]. However, many modern commodity operating systems, including Apple Mac OS X (OSX), Microsoft Windows
(Windows), and Linux, only use two processor privilege levels: one privilege level for
user tasks and one for for supervisor tasks. The modes of processor operation are
referred to as “user mode” and “kernel mode” respectively. Tasks running in kernel
mode are able to execute all instructions including privileged instructions. In contrast, tasks running in user mode are restricted to running a subset of instructions
that excludes privileged instructions. The transition between user and kernel mode,
via a system call, requires a system interrupt and is therefore computationally more
expensive than executing without a mode switch [27].
Guest + Ring 3

User Tasks

User Tasks

User Tasks

Guest + Ring 0

Guest Kernel

Guest Kernel

Guest Kernel

VM 0

VM 1

Host + Ring 3

VMM

Host + Ring 0

Host Kernel

...

VM n

Physical Hardware

Figure 2.2. Privilege execution modes

Some modern processors also include support for an additional more privileged
mode that is used for hardware-assisted virtualization [28,29]. The processor supports
a “host” and “guest” mode. When hardware-assisted virtualization is employed, the
virtual machine monitor (VMM) and host operating system runs in host mode and
each virtual machine (VM) runs in guest mode. Figure 2.2 illustrates privilege rings
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combined with these virtualization modes. Virtualization-based security mechanisms
such as NICKLE and SecVisor take advantage of this additional layer of privilege
by placing protection mechanisms in the host that are designed to protect the guest
operating systems [18, 30].

2.2.2 Reference Monitors
In the “Anderson Report,” published in 1972, Anderson et. al. described the
“reference monitor” concept [31]. A reference validation mechanism (RFM), that
realizes the reference monitor concept, mediates the operations performed by a system
subject on a system object; read and write are two examples of an operation users
and processes are two examples of a subject; files and I/O devices are two examples
of an object. The reference monitor uses an access matrix to determine the access
rights between subjects and objects.
Any executing program that is not part of the security mechanism must access
system objects through the reference monitor. Anderson sets out the following three
requirements for such a mechanism: (1) it must be tamperproof, (2) it must always
be invoked, and (3) it must be a small enough program that its correctness can be
verified.
Many security mechanisms can be loosely classified as reference monitors because they attempt to enforce memory access control between subjects and objects.
However, the requirements are not easily satisfied. For example, any in-kernel security mechanisms share vulnerabilities with the kernel and are therefore not tamperproof unless the kernel itself is tamperproof. Additionally, when integrated into
a general-purpose operating system kernel, the trusted computing base (TCB) is
large and not easily verified. Some VMM-based security mechanisms approximate a
RFM [18, 30, 32, 33] because the mechanism is placed outside of the protected system
and therefore mostly isolated from the vulnerable system. Additionally, because a
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VMM has a specialized set of responsibilities, it can be relatively lightweight and
easier to prove correct than a general-purpose operating system [32].

2.2.3 Control Flow Integrity
A software vulnerability is defined, by Bishop and Daily as “an authorized state
from which an unauthorized state can be reached using authorized state transitions”
[34]. The state transitions are authorized. However, the sequence of state transitions
is not authorized. If a security mechanism calculates ahead of time all valid execution
sequences and can verify control flow integrity (CFI) during run-time, then it may
be able to dynamically detect and prevent the system from reaching unauthorized
states.
Some of the other mitigation techniques described can be weakly referred to as
CFI verification and enforcement such as the stack canaries technique described in
Section 2.2.5. The stack canaries technique prevents the system from following an
unauthorized control flow sequence. However, Adabi et. al. describe a stronger CFI
design [35]. Ahead of time a control-flow graph (CFG) is built that includes all of the
valid control flow paths. Then the CFG is checked during run-time to verify CFI.
Performing CFI verification after every instruction fetch would be extremely computationally expensive. Adabi et. al. perform the verification step at the function
level. They instrument the code with two new custom call and return instructions.
The new instructions operate on unique identifiers, rather than memory addresses.
Then the transitions from one function to another can be compared to the CFG. They
show experimentally that CFI enforcement incurs a 45% overhead in the worst case.

2.2.4 NX
One general approach to prevent the introduction of code by an attacker is to make
regions of memory that are designated for data storage non-executable. Historically
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this was done by leveraging memory segmentation as in the non-executable stack
technique described in the following subsection.
In addition to memory segmentation, many modern processor architectures support a page-level permission option for restricting memory execution at the hardwarelevel [12, 13]. This memory page option is often referred to as the “NX bit.” If the
NX bit is set, the processor is not permitted to perform an instruction fetch from
that memory page.
Following are two techniques that enforce non-executable protection schemes.

W ⊕X
A program residing in memory has multiple distinct sections. Some of the sections
contain data and some of the sections contain code. Generally a section contains either
code or data but not both. A section may hold both code and data as described in
Section 2.2.4 but this is atypical. As a result, sections that contain data rarely need
to be executable.
Once machine code has been loaded into memory, it rarely changes. Under certain
circumstance, such as run-time kernel patching, code may be modified after it has
been loaded [36]. However, this is atypical. As a result, sections that contain code
rarely need to be writeable.
Some operating systems therefore often enforce a W ⊕ X memory access control
policy. This policy ensures that no area of memory can be both writeable and executable. At load time, memory sections that contain code are set to read-only and
memory sections that contain data are set to non-executable.
An attacker who wishes to add his own executable payload to process memory
will fail if the system is enforcing a W ⊕ X memory access control policy. If he adds
code to a data section, the malicious code will not be executable. If he attempts to
add code to a code section, the write will fail because the section is read-only.
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A W ⊕ X access control policy does not protect systems from ROP or JOP attacks because those attack techniques do not rely on new code being added to the
system. Additionally, this technique has a couple of NX bit-related implementation
limitations. First, sections of memory may not be aligned on page boundaries. As a
result, some memory pages may contain both code and data. These pages are sometimes referred to as “mixed pages.” Mixed pages cannot be protected by a page-level
access control mechanism such as the NX bit without assistance from other security
mechanisms such as those presented in hvmHarvard [33].
Second, in-kernel page-level hardware-based access control mechanisms can be
switched off by an attacker with supervisor-level permissions. Therefore, any hijacked process with sufficient privileges can disable the protection scheme. For this
reason, virtual machine based security systems such as NICKLE, hvmHarvard and
SecVisor have been created to enforce the W ⊕ X protection scheme from outside of
the protected system [18, 30, 33].

Non-Executable Stack
In the case of a stack-based buffer overflow, the attacker already controls part of
the stack memory. At the same time that the attacker is manipulating the return
address by smashing the stack, he could write an instruction sequence into the stack
memory region and set the return address to the beginning of that sequence. This
technique was used by the first Internet worm described by Spafford in 1989 [20].
In 1997, the a Linux kernel developer introduced a set of Linux kernel patches
that prevented the execution of code located in the stack memory region [37]. This
approach prevented attackers from introducing executable code while smashing the
stack. However, it does not protect the return address from being modified. The same
kernel developer that introduced the non-executable stack simultaneously introduced
the return-into-libc attack previously mentioned [21].
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This technique is not compatible with some existing programming techniques. For
example, in GCC nested functions are permitted. A nested function is a function that
is declared inside of another function. The compiled code that represents a nested
function is very similar to a normal function. However, the nested function shares
the stack of the parent function. As a result if one wants to use a pointer to a nested
function, some care must be taken to first set the stack pointer. GCC implements
this using trampolines. A trampoline is a small portion of code that it is written to
the stack and then executed. The trampoline sets up the stack pointer appropriately
and then jumps to the nested function. The trampoline will fail if the stack is set
to non-executable. To accomodate this situation and other similar situations, the
system must occasionally relax the non-executable stack restriction.

2.2.5 Stack Canaries
Attackers often use stack-based buffer overflow exploits to hijack program controlflow. Non-executable memory protection techniques do not prevent stack-based buffer
overflows, they merely prevent the attacker from executing his own code after he has
already hijacked the control flow.
The system can prevent stack-based buffer overflow control flow hijacking if it can
detect that a buffer overflow event has occurred. To detect that a stack-based buffer
overflow has occurred, some systems implement “stack canaries” [38, 39]. A stack
canary is a special value stored on the stack by the operating system upon function
entry. The operating system preserves a copy of the special value for verification
purposes. The special value is dynamic and is not easily obtained by an attacker.
Before the function pops the return value off the stack, the operating system verifies
that the stack canary value matches the stored canary value. If the stack has been
smashed, then the canary will be overwritten and verification will fail.
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2.2.6 System Randomization
Some attacks, such as the return-oriented techniques previously described, require
the memory addresses of specific kernel instructions. An attacker must be able to
predict the correct addresses or the attack will fail and the exploited program will
likely encounter a fault. Depending on the exploited vulnerability, the attacker may
be able to guess the addresses at run-time. However, often these attacks are crafted
for predetermined memory layouts [40]. Techniques have been developed to make the
addresses of such components unpredictable using various randomization techniques
such as address space layout randomization (ASLR), Instruction Set Randomization
(ISR), and Data Structure Layout Randomization (DSLR) [41]. We introduce a new
protection technique in Chapter 4 that fits into this category.

Address Space Layout Randomization
When a commodity operating system loader prepares a program for execution
it lays out various sections in memory including the program text, user stack, user
heap, and memory mapped files including dynamic system libraries. If ASLR is not
employed, the location of these key sections is predictable. If ASLR is employed,
then the location of these key sections is unpredictable because the starting address
of each section is different upon every new execution of the program2 .
Shacham et al. demonstrated that ASLR on 32 bit x86 architectures is vulnerable
to brute force attacks [40]. The primary reason for this vulnerability is that only 16
bits of a 32 bit address are randomizable as the result of architecture limitations such
as memory alignment. If the attack is repeatable therefore, a brute force attack takes
a relatively short amount of time to succeed. The authors recommend moving to a
64 bit architecture to remedy this vulnerability.
2

some systems, such as PaX on Linux, do not rerandomize the layout of child processes
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Instruction Set Randomization
Kc et al. introduced another randomization technique named Instruction Set
Randomization [42]. This technique randomizes the machine instructions of a loaded
program. When an instruction is fetched from memory it must first be decoded
prior to running on the processor. Malicious code that is injected into the loaded
program memory would not be randomized in the same way and therefore fail to run
as intended.
Some specialized processors have support for similar run-time transformations.
However, without hardware support, the technique has significant performance costs.

Data Structure Layout Randomization
Data Structure Layout Randomization (DSLR) is a protection technique that
randomizes the layout of data structures at compile-time. Attackers often construct
attack code for specific data structure layouts. For example, it is common for a kernel
rootkit to hide itself from the process list to evade detection. To do this the rootkit
must manipulate the list of tasks. In the Linux kernel, these tasks are represented by
the “task struct.” ADSLR can be employed to randomize the layout of task struct
and prevent this rootkit behavior.
Our randomization work, as described in Chapter 4, is partially inspired by previous work in DSLR by Lin et. al [43]. Our record field order randomization technique
is similar to the data structure layout randomization method described therein.
We build upon their work with two separate but related efforts. First, we introduce
a technique for automatically determining the suitability of a record for randomization. This is listed as a limitation of the previous work. Second, we introduce a novel
polymorphing software technique.
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2.2.7 ROP Defenses
ROP Detection
Chen et. al. introduced one of the first techniques for detecting ROP attacks [44].
Their system is named DROP. To detect an ROP attack, DROP dynamically intercepts all return instructions. If the corresponding return address popped from the
stack is within the memory region occupied by libc, then DROP begins counting instructions until another return instruction is encountered. If the number of instruction
is less than some predetermined threshold, then they classify that sequence of code a
potential gadget. If at least three potential gadgets are detected in sequence and the
total number of sequential potential gadgets is greater than a second predetermined
threshold, then the DROP reports the presence of an ROP attack. This method uses
dynamic binary instrumentation and is therefore computationally expensive averaging slow down factor of about five. Though computationally inefficient, the detection
rate for the tested attacks was strong with a low false-positive rate.

ROP Prevention
Li et. al. observed that ROP attacks could be prevented by instrumenting the call
and return instructions to include one level of indirection [45]. When a call is made,
the return address is stored in a centralized lookup table rather than on the stack
directly. The table index of the return address stored on the stack. When the function
returns, the index is popped off the stack and used as a lookup key to calculate the
return address. The program then jumps to the return address. Program flow never
jumps directly to the return address stored on the stack. If the attacker were to
smash the stack and overwrite the return address index, the table lookup would fail
or control flow would jump to an instruction immediately following a previous call
site. This technique does not prevent JOP attacks described in [46].
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2.3 Kernel Specialization and Minimization
2.3.1 Kernel Specialization
Operating systems kernels often provide a facility for adding code to or activating
code in the kernel during compile-time, boot-time, or at run-time. Every operating
system implements such mechanisms in a unique way however, the designs are similar.
In Linux and BSD, for example, a user may choose from an extensive list of features
to be included in the kernel at compile-time by selecting from a list of configuration
options. At boot-time, some operating systems include the ability to pass boot flags
to the kernel. The flags instruct the kernel to activate or deactivate the corresponding
code (and data). At run-time, kernels may often be augmented by loadable kernel
modules (LKMs) [10, 47]. LKMs are often used to introduce hardware-specific code
into the kernel such as device drivers.
Kernels that support LKMs are “dynamically extensible.” They allow for additive
run-time specialization but the original kernel image remains unmolested. However,
some modern kernels contain self-patching kernel code; they may overwrite executable
kenel instructions in memory after load-time. Such dynamic patching may occur
for a variety of reason including: CPU optimizations, multiprocessor compatibility
adjustments, and advanced debugging [36].
Pu and Massalin took specialization further in The Synthesis Kernel [48] (Syntehsis). Synthesis contains a code synthesizer that performs run-time kernel routine
specialization for performance enhancements. The techniques employed by the code
synthesizer resemble a few common compiler optimization techniques including constant folding and function inlining. In Synthesis, frequently visited routines are optimized for specific run-time conditions. If the specific conditions are met, then the
code branches from the unoptimized routine into the specialized routine.

30
2.3.2 Operating System Minimization
The hardware rings described in Section 2.2.1 are used by many operating systems
to separate user-level execution from kernel-level execution. However, it is not always
clear what code should be included in the kernel space. This topic has been hotly
debated by kernel designers [49].
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Kernel Mode
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Figure 2.3. Microkernel and Monolithic Kernel Designs

The objective of a microkernel kernel design is to minimize the amount of code
executed in kernel mode. In this type of kernel, as many kernel features as possible
are moved into user space [50, 51]. The kernel then behaves more like a server in
a client-server construction. Some potential advantages of this approach are fidelity
and manageability. A potential drawback of this approach is increased mode switches
that, as previously discussed, are computationally expensive.
The objective of a monolithic kernel design is to maximize efficiency. In this type
of kernel, many kernel features are included in kernel space that do not strictly need
kernel-level privileges. Some potential advantages of this approach are performance
and ease of development. Some potential drawbacks of this approach are suboptimal
fault isolation and software management.
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In 1975 Saltzer and M. Schroeder, in their seminal work titled The Protection
of Information in Computer Systems, described the security principle: “economy of
mechanism.” The economy of mechanism states that all system components, security
components in particular, should be “as simple and small as possible” [26]. A microkernel design follows more faithfully this principle. In point of fact, a general-purpose
microkernel named seL4 has been created and completely formally verified [52]. In
contrast, Andrew Tanenbaum, a proponent of microkernel design, refers to monolithic
design as “the big mess” because of its perceived lack of structure and ad-hoc design.
Despite its advantages, microkernels have not gained popularity. All of the commodity, general-purpose operating systems available today have a monolithic kernel
design. Two notable operating systems with microkernel designs, GNU Hurd and
Tanenbaum’s MINIX, have had significant technical barriers that ultimately hindered
their development and acceptance [49, 53].
In 2003 Bryant et. al. observed that general-purpose operating system kernels
often have system calls and kernel subsystems included that are not essential to
support the applications of the system [54]. For their Poly2 framework they use
static analysis of the applications of the system and aggressively remove non-essential
code from the kernel at compile time. As a result, each kernel in a Poly2 network is
specialized for a specific set of applications. The code removed from the kernel is no
longer exploitable.
Where Poly2 aims to minimize a commodity, general purpose operating system,
specialized operating systems, like Choices, also exist [55]. In Choices, like Poly2 ,
the operating system is tailor-made for a specific set of applications. However, the
operating system itself is designed in a modular way and the selection of components is
a natural part of the system construction process. Whereas Poly2 removes components
that already exist.
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3 VALIDATING THE INTEGRITY OF INCLUDED KERNEL COMPONENTS
Portions of the work described in this chapter are published in the proceedings of the
2012 Military Communications Conference (MILCOM) [36].

3.1 Introduction
Kernel rootkits are a particularly virulent kind of malicious software that infects
the operating system (OS) kernel. They are able to create and execute code at the
highest OS privilege level giving them full control of the system. They are not only
able to carry out malicious actions but are also able to evade detection by modifying
other system software to hide their evidence. Once detected a kernel rootkit can be
difficult to remove; it is not always obvious the extent to which the system has been
modified. The goal therefore is to prevent kernel rootkit infection.
Attackers can exploit vulnerable programs that are running with elevated permissions to insert kernel rootkits into a system. Security mechanisms similar to NICKLE
have been created to prevent kernel rootkits by relocating the vulnerable physical
system to a guest virtual machine and enforcing a W ⊕ KX memory access control
policy from the host virtual machine monitor (VMM) [18]. The W ⊕ KX memory
access control policy guarantees that no region of guest memory is both writable and
kernel-executable.
The guest system must have a way to bypass the W ⊕ KX restriction to load
valid kernel code, such as kernel drivers, into memory. To distinguish between valid
kernel code and malicious kernel rootkit code, NICKLE [18] and others [30] [33] use
cryptographic hashes for code validation. Offline, a cryptographic hash is calculated
for each piece of valid code that may get loaded into the guest kernel. Online, the
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VMM intercepts each guest attempt to load new kernel code and calculates a hash
for the code. If the online hash matches an offline hash, the load is allowed.
Some modern kernels however, are “self-patching;” they may patch kernel code
at run-time. If the patch is applied prior to hash-based validation, then the hashes
will not match. If the patch is applied after hash-based validation, then the memory
will be read-only, as a result of W ⊕ KX enforcement, and the patch will fail. Such
run-time patching may occur for a variety of reason including: CPU optimizations,
multiprocessor compatibility adjustments, and advanced debugging. The previous
hash validation procedure cannot handle such modifications.
We describe the design and implementation of a system that validates the integrity
of each instruction introduced by a self-patching kernel. We validate each instruction
by comparing it to a whitelist of valid instruction patches. We generate the whitelist
ahead of time while the guest is offline. When online, certain predetermined guest
events such as write-faults and code loading will trigger a trap into the host and give
our system the opportunity to validate new instructions.
Our system is guest-transparent; no modifications to the guest operating system
are required. However, the whitelist construction is dependent on the guest kernel.
Each guest kernel may patch itself in different ways. As we describe in Section 3.3,
the whitelist creation procedure requires knowledge of the guest kernel to collect all
of the possible valid patches. We discovered that the Linux kernel has six different
facilities that influence code modification. We describe each facility and its impact
on whitelist creation in Section 3.4.
The implementation of our instruction authentication procedure, described in
section 3.4, is part of our reimplementation of NICKLE [18]. NICKLE is a guesttransparent virtual machine monitor (VMM) that prevents unauthorized code from
executing with kernel-level privileges. NICKLE, as originally implemented, does not
take advantage of the hardware-assisted virtualization extension present in many
current processors. Our implementation, named NICKLE-KVM, takes advantage of
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these extensions by adding NICKLE functionality to the Linux Kernel-based Virtual
Machine (KVM) virtualization infrastructure.
Additionally, the original NICKLE does not support self-patching guest kernels.
NICKLE-KVM, with our instruction authentication subsystem, removes this restriction. Two other systems similar in nature to NICKLE, SecVisor [30] and hvmHarvard [33], also require that the guest does not contain self-patching kernel code.

3.2 Chapter Organization
The remaining content of this chapter is structured as follows: In Section 3.3, we
outline the problem and describe the design of our solution. Section 3.3.1 describes
the context of the problem and provides a motivating example. In Section 3.3.2 we
describe our solution in detail and demonstrate how it provides a remedy to our
motivating example. Section 3.4 describes the implementation of our system and we
report our experimental results in Section 3.5. Finally, in Section 3.7, we recap our
findings and suggest some future work.

3.3 Design
3.3.1 Problem
Preventing kernel rootkit injection is a challenge. Software is often buggy. If a
bug is exploited in kernel mode, then malicious software can gain a foothold into
the system with maximum privilege. Once such privilege is attained, the attacker
can effectively disable all other protections. For example, similar to NICKLE, some
operating systems implement a W ⊕ X memory access control scheme for kernel
code. Unfortunately, a W ⊕ X policy cannot be reliably enforced by the same system
that it is trying to protect. Because the operating system has full control over the
hardware, a bug may allow an attacker to disable all protections. Systems similar to
NICKLE solve this problem by relocating the vulnerable physical system to a guest
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virtual machine (VM) and providing W ⊕ KX access control policy enforcement from
the host virtual machine monitor (VMM). This relocation enables such systems to
provide services below the operating system [56]. In particular, the host can strictly
control guest access to memory.
As part of enforcing a W ⊕ KX policy in the guest, the host must set all regions
of memory containing guest kernel code to read-only and executable. To determine
the addresses of these regions, the host can trap on guest events that introduce new
kernel code into the guest. Two such events occur at guest kernel load-time and
kernel module load-time. To trap on these events, the guest functions that load
code into the kernel can be intercepted through, for example, debug breakpoints.
Breakpoint execution triggers a VM exit enabling the host to extract the address
range of the guest’s newly loaded code. Once the host determines the regions of
memory containing new kernel code, the code can be validated using cryptographic
hashes. Following validation, the code memory regions can be then set to read-only
and executable.

Code Authentication
Code loaded into kernel space originates in executable files stored on disk. Executable file formats divide executable files into sections. At least one section contains
machine instructions. The most primitive executable file contains one primary section that holds the machine instructions. We will refer to this section as the text
section. In addition to the text section, some executable files have many other sections that contain machine instructions. We discovered 11 such unique sections during
our experimentation (see Section 3.4 for details). We refer to all sections of a single
executable file that contain machine instructions as executable texts.
To authenticate kernel code as it is introduced into the kernel space, the original
NICKLE uses cryptographic hashes. When the guest is offline, a cryptographic hash
is calculated for each executable file that may get loaded into the guest. The hash is
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calculated over the executable text of the file. Each hash is stored, along with other
meta data, in a database. This hash database is stored in the host and is inaccessible
from the guest. When the guest is online and an attempt to load new kernel code into
the guest is detected, a trap to the host occurs. The host then calculates a hash over
the executable texts as they appear in the guest’s memory space. If the hash matches
the hash of the corresponding executable file, then the code addition is allowed and
the permissions for the new executable texts are set to read-only. If the hash does
not match, then the code addition is not allowed.
Comparing offline and online hashes does not work for relocatable code, such as
the kernel and kernel modules, because the relocation process changes addresses in the
online code. NICKLE works around this problem by writing zeroes to all relocation
call-sites prior to calculating hashes.

Code Modification
NICKLE’s hash creation and validation procedure depends on immutable kernel
code. However, some modern kernels are “self-patching;” they may overwrite executable instructions in memory after load-time. The original NICKLE hash-based
validation procedure cannot handle such modifications.
As a motivating example, Linux kernel versions greater than 2.5.68 include support
for “alternative instructions” (altinstructions1 ) [9]. Altinstructions enable the kernel
to optimize code at run-time based on the capabilities of the CPU. The example
provided in the original kernel mailing list announcement was for “run-time memory
barrier patching” (RTMBP). According to the RTMBP announcement the default
Linux memory barrier instruction sequence, lock; addl $0,0(%%esp), is slow on
Pentium 4 processors and should be replaced with the processor’s built-in memory
barrier instruction: lfence. To take advantage of the CPU’s capabilities, the Linux
distributor could package a separate kernel image tailor-made for the Pentium 4
1

We adopt this label to alleviate confusion between the intuitive meaning of the phrase “alternative
instructions” and the Linux facility.
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processor or dynamically patch the instructions at run-time using the altinstructions
kernel feature.
Consider how the existing code authentication procedure would work in the presence of RTMBP. Offline a hash would be calculated over a section of text containing
the unoptimized memory barrier: lock; addl $0,0(%%esp). When online and that
section of code gets loaded into the guest kernel, the host has two options. The first
option is for the host to check the hash prior to run-time modifications. If the corresponding memory is set to read-only immediately following hash validation, then
future run-time modifications will fail and the guest system will run without optimizations (because the destination kernel code region is set to read-only). The second
option is for the host to check the hash after run-time modifications have been applied. However, the hash will not match on a Pentium 4 processor because the stored
hash was calculated over the original instruction (lock; addl $0,0(%%esp)) not the
optimized instructions (lfence).

3.3.2 Approach
Our approach to solving the problem introduced by self-patching kernels is patchlevel validation. We observe that if the guest kernel can introduce new instructions at
run-time and those instructions take the form of a constrained set of patches (possibly
requiring source code or vendor documentation to determine), then we can create a
whitelist of valid instruction patches.
We refer to each valid replacement instruction as a “patch” and each description
of the patch as a “patch definition.” Offline we generate a whitelist of valid patch
definitions that we refer to as the “patch set.” Each patch definition is a 3-tuple:
(patch-location, patch-length, patch-data). The patch-location describes the address,
relative to the start of the text section, where the patch may get applied. The patchlength describes the size of the replacement instruction. The patch-data holds the
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replacement instruction in raw binary form. We refer to the location in a text section
that may or may not be patched at run time as a “patch site.”
The patch set and the hash database are similar; the hash database is used to
validate the integrity of new executable kernel code (minus patches) and the patch
set is used to validate individual patches to kernel code. The patch set is created
while the guest system is offline, stored in the host system, and is inaccessible from
the guest.

Patch Set Creation
Patch set creation varies widely and is dependent on the self-patching mechanisms
present in the guest kernel. During our experimentation with a Linux guest kernel,
we discovered six unique facilities with which the kernel patches itself. We list them
in Section 3.4 and describe some of the challenges they pose to patch-level validation.
For now, we reintroduce our motivating example of RTMBP to demonstrate the
creation of our patch set.
Recall that RTMBP uses the altinstructions mechanism to achieve kernel patching.
Prior to getting loaded into the system, kernel code is stored on disk in executable files;
in this case, kernel code is stored in an executable and linkable format (ELF) file. Each
ELF file carries with it all of its own altinstruction patches defined by two ELF file
sections: “.altinstructions” and “.altinstr replacement”. The .altinstructions section
contains a set of zero or more “alt instr” structures with the following fields: (*instr,
*replacement, cpuid, instrlen, replacementlen). Two fields of this structure, *instr
and instrlen, map directly to our patch definition fields patch-location and patchlength respectively. The third patch definition field, patch-data, can be copied directly
from the bytes stored at *replacement (of length replacementlen). The *replacement
pointer points to an address located in the .altinstr replacement ELF section.
Our patch set creation procedure adds two patch definitions for each alt instr.
The first patch definition corresponds to the default instruction, such as “lock;
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addl $0,0(%%esp)” for RTMBP, located in the text. The second patch definition
corresponds to the replacement instruction, lfence for RTMBP, described by the alt instr. Both definitions have the same patch-location values and the same patch-length
values because they are both candidates for the same patch site. When patch-level
validation occurs at run-time, the instruction present in memory must match one of
the candidates.
Each executable file (kernel or kernel module) that may get loaded into the guest
kernel has a corresponding offline patch set. When the guest comes online and attempts to load code from an executable file, the corresponding offline patch set entries
are copied by the host into the online patch set. The online patch set is identical in
structure to the offline patch set. The patch-location values however are recalculated
to reflect the guest memory address of the patch site (as opposed to the relative
patch-location in the original executable file). The online patch set is a subset of the
offline version. It only contains entries for texts that are loaded into the guest kernel.

Run-Time Patch-Level Validation
If the guest is protected by a W ⊕ KX security policy then during run-time when
the guest self-patching kernel tries to modify previously authenticate code, an access
violation will occur (write-fault). This access violation can be trapped by the host
and used as an opportunity to perform patch-level validation.
The write-fault event provides an address corresponding to the access control
violation. For each write-fault we lookup the faulting address in our online patch
set. If the instructions to-be-written match the patch-data field of one of the patch
definitions in the patch set, then validation succeeds.
If patch-level validation succeeds, then the write is permitted. We temporarily
remove the read-only restriction allowing the guest to execute one write instruction,
the one that triggered the write fault, and then we reapply the read-only access
restriction. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 3.1.

40
guest
New Kernel
Code (C)

Patches
destined for C

Copy C to W+NX
memory

For each patch P
modify C

VM exit
(debug breakpoint fault)

VM entry

VM exit for each P
(write fault)

Apply RO+X
Permissions to C

Compare P to
patch set

Write P to C
(single step)
VM exit
VM entry (singl-step fault)

host
Compare C to
crypto. hash

Y
Hash
Database

Apply W+NX
Permissions to C
Y

Verified?

Patch Set

Verified?

Figure 3.1. Run-Time Patch-Level Validation
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Load-Time Optimized Patch-Level Validation
For our system, each write-fault causes two VM exits. The first is the result of the
write-fault itself, and is unavoidable for systems similar to NICKLE in the presence
of a self-patching kernel. The second VM exit allows us to reapply the read-only

41
access control restriction to kernel code. VM exits are expensive, therefore we offer
the following optimization that significantly reduces the number of VM exits caused
by self-patching kernels.
During experimentation we discovered that many changes made by self-patching
kernels happen immediately after the code is loaded into memory and before it is
executed. Recall from Section 3.3.1 that if we try to compare the cryptographic hash
of the code after it has been modified, then the hashes will not match. However, we
can adjust the hash generation procedure to accommodate self modifying code. Recall
from Section 3.3.1 how NICKLE calculates a cryptographic hash in the presence of
relocatable code; it writes all zeroes to the relocation sites prior to hash calculation.
We use a similar method for load-time optimized patch-validation. From the patch
set we know all of the patch sites present in the code. We write zeroes to those
locations prior to hash creation. When online, we defer validation until after the
code has been loaded and modified.
At validation time we first check the integrity of the code using the hash database.
Secondly we check the integrity of each unique patch site using the corresponding
patch set. If the hash matches and the contents of each patch site are validated,
then patch-level validation succeeds and the code is added to authenticated memory.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates this procedure in the context of NICKLE-KVM. As shown
in the figure, the optimized approach incurs no additional VM exits for patch-level
validation.

3.4 Implementation
Our patch-level validation procedure is implemented as a subsystem of NICKLEKVM. NICKLE-KVM is a NICKLE-like system based on KVM. KVM is a Linuxbased VMM that takes advantage of hardware-assisted virtualization. The original
NICKLE implementation, based on QEMU, does not take advantage of hardwareassisted virtualization. Instead, it uses binary translation to intercept each instruc-
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tion to preserve the NICKLE guarantee: “No unauthorized code can be executed at
the kernel level. [18]” Instead of the instruction-level redirection technique used by
NICKLE, we use the page-level redirection technique introduced by hvmHarvard and
takes advantage of hardware-assisted virtualization for better performance [33]. In
the absence of a complete description of NICKLE-KVM, we describe the parts we
leveraged for our implementation next.
To evaluate our design, we implemented the optimized patch-level validation solution described in Section 3.3.2 for both kernel and module loading. To support our
solution, we modified NICKLE-KVM in the following ways:
1. At both kernel load-time (boot) and module load-time the guest must pass
control to the host for code authentication. Therefore, at guest system start
up we set a hardware debug break point on the return addresses of the guest
Linux functions named “init post” and “trim init extable” for kernel and module authentication respectively. These addresses are reached immediately after
patches have been applied making them an ideal point in the loading sequence
to trigger our authentication procedures. KVM gives us access to the guest’s
virtual CPU (vcpu) allowing us to set the corresponding debug registers for
these break points. Our implementation catches the resulting debug exceptions
and then performs code and patch-level validation.
2. If code validation succeeds, NICKLE-KVM must apply the read-only and execute permissions to the new code prior to returning control to the guest. We
notify NICKLE-KVM of the new code and it handles the manipulation of and
enforcement of the page-level permissions.
3. If code validation fails, the host can take protective measures. In the case
of kernel validation failing, the host could force the guest to shutdown. In
the case of module validation failing, the host could force the module to fail
loading by manipulating guest execution. For example, in one version of our
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implementation we forced the return value of the function “module finalize” to
be -1 by manipulating a guest vcpu register (EAX).

3.4.1 Experimental Setup
We implemented NICKLE-KVM and our patch-level validation subsystem using
an Intel i5-2410M 2.30GHz processor. Both our host and guest systems run an unmodified version of Ubuntu (11.04 2.6.38-8-generic). The host runs the 64 bit version
of Ubuntu (x86 64) and the guest runs the 32 bit version (i686). NICKLE-KVM is a
modified version of KVM version 2.6.38.6.

3.4.2 Patch Validation
Recall that patch set creation is heavily dependent on knowledge of the guest
kernel. Through analysis of the Linux kernel source code we found six facilities that
contribute to kernel run-time patching: Alternative Instructions, SMP Locks, Jump
Labels, Mcounts, Paravirtual Instructions, and Kprobes. For our implementation
four of the six kinds apply, however we list them all here for completeness. For each
of the four that do apply, we describe how it influences patch set creation.

Alternative Instructions
Our motivating example of RTMBP, introduced in Section 3.3, was an instance
of altinstructions. Recall that the purpose of altinstructions is to allow the kernel to
optimize code at run-time based on the capabilities of the CPU. The ELF file that
contains the loadable kernel code has two sections used by kernel patching functions
related to altinstructions: .altinstructions and .altinstr replacement. The details of
how we derive a patch definition from these sections can be found in Section 3.3.2.
The altinstructions patch sites do not change after the code has been loaded for the
first time because the the CPU capabilities do not change during run-time.
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In all cases that we encountered patching facilities modified only the .text ELF
section with the one exception of altinstructions getting applied to the kernel (not
modules). In this case, altinstructions were applied to both the .text and .init.text
executable sections.

SMP Locks
The SMP locks code modification mechanism is similar to altinstructions. Based
on the capabilities of the CPU, the kernel module code may be modified at load-time.
The Linux kernel modules shipped with Ubuntu are compiled for both symmetric
multiprocessing (SMP) and uniprocessor systems (UP). When the code is running on
an SMP system, a lock prefix (0xF0 for x86) is used to indicate that the following
read-modify-write instructions should be executed atomically. However, when the
kernel is running on a UP system the SMP locks are not needed. In that case, the
kernel modifies the module code to remove SMP locks (by replacing each with DS
segment override prefix, 0x3E for x862 )
ELF files with SMP locks in their code have a special section named “.smp locks”
that holds zero or more 4-byte addresses. Each address corresponds to an SMP lock
site in the text section. The length of the lock is one byte. Therefore for each
SMP patch site, two patch definitions are created: (<address from header>, 1, 0xF0)
and (<address from header>, 1, 0x3E). For the same reasons as altinstructions, the
module’s SMP locks code does not change after the module has been loaded.

Jump Labels
Jump labels were introduced into the Linux kernel to optimize kernel tracing [57].
Prior to Jump Labels, if a developer wanted to add a trace point to his code he included a conditional statement to evaluate if tracing was enabled. If enabled, the code
would jump to a code block that provided tracing information. To avoid the overhead
2

See the Linux kernel function alternatives smp unlock() for details.
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associated with the conditional statement, Jump Labels are used. Essentially a Jump
Label site in code contains either a jump instruction (JMP) or a NOP instruction.
At module load-time, the site contains a JMP instruction and it is overwritten with a
NOP instruction. When tracing is enabled for that Jump Label, the JMP instruction
is reintroduced. The result is that most of the time tracing logic incurs no overhead
(except the overhead associated with the NOP instruction).
ELF files with Jump Labels in their code have a special section named “ jump table.” For each Jump Label an entry exists in the

jump table table. Each entry

has the following fields: code, target, key. The code field corresponds to the location
in text where the Jump Label is inserted. The target field corresponds to the jump
target (where to jump when tracing is enabled for this Jump Label). Each Jump
Label is identified by a unique key. When one wants to enable tracing for that Jump
Label he calls the Linux function named “enable jump label” with the Jump Label
key as a parameter.
For each Jump Label location, two patch definitions are created: (<address from
code field>, 5, <NOP of size 53 >) and (<address from code field>, 5, JMP <address
from label field>). Unlike altinstructions and SMP Locks, Jump Label code sites get
changed at load-time (NOP inserted) and when tracing is enabled (JMP inserted).
For this implementation we are interested in the changes made at load-time (NOP
inserted). For kernel tracing to work, NICKLE-KVM must perform patch-level validation at write-fault time as described in Section 3.3.2.

Mcounts
When Linux kernel code is compiled with the “-pg” flag the compiler automatically
adds a call to the mcount procedure at the beginning of each kernel function [58].
This feature enables kernel profiling and tracing. To optimize Mcounts, when code
is loaded that contains mcount call sites, the kernel automatically replaces the call
3

0x3e 0x8d 0x74 0x26 0x00
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instructions with a DS segment override prefixes (0x3E) as in the case of SMP Locks.
Later when mcount tracing is enabled, the call instruction will be restored.
Because the mcount symbol is relocatable, the patch-location can be calculated
based on relocation information found in the .rel.text section. The start of the patchlocation is one byte before the mcount symbol address in the text. For each Mcount
patch site, two patch definitions are created: (<byte offset of mcount from .rel.text
- 1>, 1, 0x3E) and (<byte offset of mcount from .rel.text - 1>, 1, 0xe8). Similar
to Jump Labels, mcount call sites will get changed during run-time when tracing
is enabled. For kernel tracing to work, NICKLE-KVM must perform patch-level
validation at write-fault time as described in Section 3.3.2.

Other Facilities
During our exploration of the Linux kernel source code we discovered two facilities
that influenced run-time patching but did not ultimately apply to this implementation: Paravirtual Instructions and Kprobes. We list them briefly here for posterity.
Similar to the four facilities detailed previously, Paravirtual Instructions have a
special section in the ELF file (.parainstructions) [59]. The .parainstructions section
has an entry for each location in the text that holds an instruction that needs to
be modified if the guest is running in a paravirtualized environment. Our guest is
not running in a paravirtualized environment. Therefore, we explicitly turn off this
feature in the guest kernel by supplying the “noreplace-paravirt” boot option at boottime. If paravirtualized instruction were to be used in our implementation, further
work would have to be done to generate the corresponding patch set entries.
Kprobes [60] (including jprobes and kretprobes) are distinct from the other facilities in that they do not have a corresponding ELF file section for calculating patch set
entries. Kprobes are typically used for debugging and each patch site is defined by the
end user at debug time. Therefore, Kprobes could work in the presence of patch-level
instruction validation if the end user supplied a list of potential probe patch sites to
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the offline patch set creation procedure. Because Kprobes are inserted at run-time,
they do not apply directly to the optimized implementation that we describe here.

3.5 Evaluation
To evaluate our system we generated patch sets for the Linux kernel (vmlinux)
and 3308 kernel modules (only 11 modules4 were needed by our guest system). The
kernel contained 31643 patch sites in total. The 11 modules contained 639 patch
sites in total. After implementing patch-level validation, NICKLE-KVM correctly
validated the integrity of all 32282 patch sites.
If an attacker were to modify the text section of previously profiled code, then
validation should fail or the malicious code should be discarded. We tested this
scenario by manipulating the text section of a module and loading it into the guest.
If the modified instruction was not in a location subject to receiving all zeros, e.g.
a patch or relocation site, then our system prevented the module from loading as
expected. If the spurious instruction was part of a patch or relocation site, then
the module passed the initial hash-based validation but the kernel overwrote the
instruction, the instruction was discarded, and the module was allowed to load. If
the spurious instruction was part of a patch site and was overwritten by the kernel,
then as in the relocation case, the spurious instruction was discarded and the module
loaded without the instruction. If the spurious instruction was part of a patch site
and was not overwritten by the kernel, then patch-level validation correctly identified
the foreign code and prevented the module from loading.
If an attacker were to modify one of the candidate replacement instructions found
in the .altinstr replacement section of previously profiled code, then validation should
fail or the malicious code should be discarded. We validated this scenario by manipulating the .altinstr replacement section of a module and loading it into the guest.
If the spurious instruction was part of an instruction that was selected at load time
4

8139cp, 8139too, binfmt misc, floppy, i2c-piix4, lp, parport, parport pc, ppdev, psmouse, serio raw
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by the guest kernel, then patch-level validation failed and the module was prevented
from loading.
Our implementation incurs no additional VM exits for patch-level validation. We
merely reuse the single VM exit already required by NICKLE-KVM to perform hash
validation. In the presence of patches that are applied well after loading, such as
Kprobe patches, the less efficient procedure described in Section 3.3.2 is required.

3.6 Discussion
We assume that other commodity operating system kernels may patch themselves
at run-time using a procedure similar to the Linux patching mechanisms described
in Section 3.3.1. Our patch whitelist generation technique depends on our ability
to accurately predict the location, size and contents of all possible patches ahead of
time. Our patching technique also assumes that patches will not exceed the size of the
original instruction and that patches are applied in-place. Our techniques rely heavily
on our analysis of the Linux kernel specifically, it is possible that other self-patching
operating system kernels defy these assumptions.
It is possible, because of write buffering and the single-stepping method that we
use for run-time patch validation described in Section 3.3.2, that an attacker could
craft a malicious patch that is a combination of bytes from multiple valid patch definitions. We can limit this vulnerability by ensuring that a patch-site is the combination
of no more than two valid patches. To do this, we must locate all patch definitions
that include the faulting address in the range patch-location to patch-location plus
patch-length. If a matching patch definition is discovered, then the range of guest
memory from patch-location to faulting address, instruction prefix, is compared to
the corresponding instruction prefix in the patch definition data. If the instruction
prefix matches, then we compare the new data, that caused the write-fault, to the
corresponding segment in the patch definition. If it too matches, then the validation
succeeds. We do not validate the instruction suffix because the existing instruction
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has already been validated. This ensures that at any given time the instruction
in memory is a combination of no more than two authenticated instructions. This
reduces the risks associated with malicious control flow manipulations.
The patch-definition whitelist creation technique described in Section 3.3.2 may
incur significant one-time costs for initial analysis. For our evaluation of the Linux kernel, we discovered six patching mechanisms. Each mechanism requires a customized
patch-definition procedure.
Our code authentication and a W ⊕ KX protection policy do not prevent attacks
that reuse authenticated code. As a result, systems protected only by these techniques
will be vulnerable to ROP-style attacks. Further discussion of ROP countermeasures
is provided in Chapters 4 and 5.

3.7 Summary
NICKLE-like systems must have a way to authenticate kernel code when it is
loaded into the guest kernel space. Previous NICKLE-like systems were not able
to authenticate code introduced by self-patching kernels. Our procedure provides
a way for NICKLE-like systems to accommodate self-patching kernels by validating
each patch introduced by the kernel. We implemented our system in the context of
NICKLE-KVM and demonstrated how patch-level validation correctly permits valid
kernel patches to be applied and rejects patches that are invalid.
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4 INCREASING THE DIVERSITY OF INCLUDED KERNEL COMPONENTS
Portions of the work described in this chapter are published in the proceedings of
the 2013 International Performance Computing and Communications Conference
(IPCCC) [61].

4.1 Introduction
Organizations have strong economic incentive to standardize the software that
they use across their enterprise [62]. Furthermore, organizations have strong economic
incentive to choose market-leading software [63]. Such economic incentives have lead
to a homogeneity of operating system software among network-connected hosts. This
homogeneity increases the risk of mass exploitation of similarly vulnerable hosts.
[64, 65].
The vast majority of hosts on the Internet, including mobile clients, are running
one of three major operating system families1 . Within each operating system family
there exists many versions of the operating system code. However, relative to the total
number of hosts, the number of unique versions of operating systems is minuscule.
Malicious operating system kernel software, such as the code introduced by a
kernel rootkit, is strongly dependent on the organization of the victim operating
system. The lack of diversity in operating systems enables attackers to craft a single
kernel exploit for a single unique operating system version that has the potential to
infect millions of hosts.
One approach to strengthen computer security is software diversity. Organizations
can choose to add diversity to their software ecosystem by purchasing less popular
1

http://www.netmarketshare.com/
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software that performs the same tasks. However, such a choice is often not economically feasible even if viable alternatives exists [62].
Another approach to software diversification is for the software itself to mutate;
where multiple variants of the same version of a piece of software are used. The
variants are compatible with each other and function the same from the end-user’s
point of view. However, some underlying component of their structure has been
changed.
Computer virus authors have long used automatic software diversification to avoid
detection. Each time the virus infects a new victim the virus mutates. This mutation
prevents signature-based anti-virus software from detecting the virus. This class of
malware is often referred to as polymorphic computer viruses [66, 67]. In much the
same way, but inverted, polymorphic software can be used offensively to withstand
malicious software. If the vulnerable components of a piece of software have been
changed in an unpredictable manner, then attackers must create many unique variations of their exploit to attack vulnerable systems en masse. If enough variants exists,
then mass exploitation is much more difficult to achieve if not impossible.
Some attacks, such as the return-oriented techniques introduced by [21], [2] and [3]
require the memory addresses of key system libraries. An attacker must be able to
predict the correct addresses or the attack will fail and the exploited program will
likely encounter a fault. Depending on the exploited vulnerability, the attacker may
be able to guess the addresses at run-time. However, often these attacks are crafted
for predetermined memory layouts [40]. If the memory layout can be obfuscated in
some way, then the exploitation can be thwarted.
Forrest et. al. make a strong case for software diversity and describe a few possible
techniques including: adding or removing nonfunctional code, reordering code, and
reordering memory layouts [8]. Our technique builds on the latter. We describe two
different ways to mutate an operating system kernel using memory layout reordering
to resist kernel-based attacks.

52
Our randomization techniques occur at compile-time. Some software diversification techniques occur at run-time or load-time. Some, such as instruction set randomization, incur significant run-time overhead [42]. In contrast, our techniques incur no
run-time overhead and are therefore suitable for any system including low-powered
devices such as mobile phones and embedded devices.
Our randomization techniques are tailored specifically for operating system kernels. The techniques themselves have wider application, however they are practically
well suited for an operating system kernel. Because our technique occurs at compiletime all dependent software must be recompiled to be compatible. In the user-space,
this could be a significant undertaking; if for example, one wanted to randomize a
system library all dependent software would have to be recompiled. However, the
kernel compilation is self contained, loadable kernel modules notwithstanding, and
its code is executed only through well-defined system calls. Our system does allow
for loadable kernel modules to be compiled with compatible randomization during
kernel compilation or separately.
Practically, we would not expect our techniques to be adopted by every end-user.
A small fraction of computer users would have the technical prowess to compile their
own kernel and for many operating systems the kernel source code is not available.
Rather, our techniques are better suited for organization-wide application. For example, military organizations often distribute their own version of the Linux kernel.
If they employed our technique they could withstand all versions of kernel malware
that was not specifically targeted for their organization. Similarly a mobile device
manufacturer could randomize their kernels so that it would be invulnerable to the
same attacks leveraged against other similar devices.
Our contributions are as follows: We introduce a new method for randomizing
the stack layout of function arguments. We refine a previous technique for record
layout randomization by introducing a static analysis technique for determining the
randomizability of a record. We provide an implementation of our techniques using
the plugin architecture offered by GCC. Finally, to evaluate the security benefits of
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our techniques we randomize multiple Linux kernels using our plugins and attack them
using kernel rootkits. We show that by strategically selecting just a few components
for randomization, our techniques prevent all tested kernel rootkits.

4.2 Chapter Organization
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: we begin in Section 4.3 by
laying out the design of our randomization techniques followed by a description of our
GCC implementation in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, we evaluate the security merits of
our approaches and the performance of our implementations. Finally, in Section 4.7,
we summarize our contributions and findings.

4.3 Design
Our design has three distinct but related parts: record field order randomization
(RFOR), RFOR suitability analysis, and subroutine argument order randomization
(SAOR). Each part is described in the following three sections.

4.3.1 Record Field Order Randomization
We have designed our field order randomization technique to occur at compiletime. During compilation we randomize the field order of the record definition. As
a result, all instances of that record type are defined with the new field order in the
resulting binary. Each compilation unit may have its own definition for a given record.
Therefore, we use a seeded pseudo-random algorithm so that the same field order can
be replicated across multiple compilation units. This also allows for modular software,
such as loadable kernel modules, to be compiled with compatible record layouts.
Our field order randomization technique takes as input the source code of the
software to be randomized, a set of one or more record names, a set of one or more
randomization seeds, and a set of one or more padding flags. Each record name may
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correspond to a unique randomization seed or one seed may apply to all record names.
Each record name corresponds to a unique padding flag that indicates whether or not
the record receives padding. Our field order randomization technique produces as
output a compiled binary. Given different randomization seeds and padding flags,
our system may produce distinct binaries. However, our field reordering algorithm
is not collision resistant; multiple seeds will produce the same field order. Naturally,
records with more fields will have more layout permutations.
To increase the possible number of layout permutations, our system takes as input
a padding flag for each record name. When this boolean flag is set to true for a given
record name a pseudorandom number of bogus fields are inserted pseudorandomly into
the record. The randomization algorithm used to add padding is also seeded with
the same seed that determines the layout. We have bound the amount of padding
automatically generated so that a record will have no more than two times the number
of fields of its original. This upper bound was selected arbitrarily. In practice, some
bound will be desired to keep the records from becoming space-inefficient.
Field order randomization takes place after the source code has been parsed into an
abstract syntax tree but before any compiler optimization passes. Figure 4.3, located
later in the implementation section (4.4.1), illustrates the abstract syntax tree for
both a randomized (b) and unrandomized (c) record. Figure 4.1 illustrates the stack
memory layout and machine instructions for assignment to an unrandomized (a) and
randomized (b) record.
Given a record type τ , Algorithm 1 depicts field order randomization subroutine.
We use the Knuth shuffling algorithm for reordering the fields [68].
When a kernel data structure is reordered using RFOR, attack code compiled,
without randomization, against the kernel source code will be incompatible. For
example, regarding the record randomization illustrated in Figure4.1, suppose the
attack code was trying to assign a malicious value to field “foo.b.” The malicious
code will assume that “foo.b” is at offset 0x8 and assign the malicious value to
offset 0xc instead. A similar problem occurs when attack code tries to read from a
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Algorithm 1 Field order randomization with padding
a[] ← τf ields
n ← count of items in a[]
if option to add padding is true then
x ← seeded pseudorandom integer < max and > min
for 1 to x do
a[] ← new field declaration
n←n+1
end for
end if
for i = n − 1 down to 1 do
j ← seeded pseudorandom integer ≥ 0 and ≤ i
swap a[j] and a[i]
end for
τf ields ← a[]
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Input: struct foo{int a;int b;int c;} bar = {1,2,3};
Source Order

Reordered

int c
int b
int a

int a
int c
int b

movl $0x1,-0xc(%R)
movl $0x2,-0x8(%R)
movl $0x3,-0x4(%R)

movl $0x1,-0x4(%R)
movl $0x2,-0xc(%R)
movl $0x3,-0x8(%R)

(a)

(b)

R

address

R-0x4
R-0x8
R-0xc

Figure 4.1. Record field order randomization.
general-purpose processor register

“R” represents a

predetermined offset. The results of the malicious code execution are unpredictable
in the presence of RFOR. For our evaluation, detailed in Section 4.5, we found that
malicious code often resulted in a non-destructive kernel “oops” (not panic) when a
victim data structure was randomized. For all tested kernel rootkits, the malicious
software failed to run as intended on systems compiled with RFOR. In some cases,
infection was prevented entirely by RFOR.

4.3.2 Suitability of a Record for Field Reordering
Not all records are suitable for field reordering. If a record is used or defined,
in a raw memory form, by an external system that expects a predetermined format,
then the record may be an unfit candidate for randomization. For example, for our
evaluation we randomized the Linux TCP header record (tcphdr). When TCP packets
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were formed using the randomized layout, the system could not communicate with
other systems using TCP. If both end-points had their TCP headers reordered in the
same way, then it may be possible for the two to communicate; assuming that deep
packet inspection or similar transport-layer logic is not present on intermediary nodes
and total header size does not change as the result of field realignment (see discussion
of record resizing in Section 4.4.1 and Figure 4.4).
If the compiler supported it, the programmer could annotate the source code to
indicate whether or not a record’s fields may be safely reordered. For example, some
compilers provide a way for the programmer to suggest how to align a variable type. In
GCC, the programmer can specify type attributes using the keyword

attribute

at

the end of a type definition. The programmer can specify the “packed” attribute of a
record to instruct the compiler not to realign its fields. We can leverage this paradigm
for our purposes; we can add a custom attribute to the compiler that indicates that the
record is unfit for field reordering. If the attribute is not present, the compiler could
freely reorder fields as it sees fit. We describe our implementation of this approach
in Section 4.4.1. This approach may have benefits beyond randomization for security
purposes. For example, if the compiler were free to reorder fields it may be able to
automatically improve record cache performance as described by Chilimbi et al [69].
In the event that such a compiler mechanism were widely adopted today, there
exists much source code that is not already annotated. In the absence of compiler
support and source code annotations, we have designed a static analysis technique for
testing the suitability of a record for field reordering.Our initial design was informed
by previous research at Hewlett-Packard in compiler optimization techniques [70].
However, our technique has a different purpose and differs significantly from this
prior work.
First we define a few terms: x, y and z are free variables. τ represents the
candidate type and ¬τ represents all other types. A type followed by an ∗ represents
a pointer to a variable of that type. τn represents field n in τ . The function A returns
the memory address of its argument.
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There are four conditions that may disqualify a record for field reordering2 :

xτ ∗ = A(y¬τ )
If a variable of type τ pointer is positioned on the lefthand-side of an assignment3
and the righthand-side expression does not result in a τ -pointer, then τ may not be
suitable for field reordering.
An example of how this operation is potentially unsafe for field reordering is as
follows: suppose that the righthand-side expression is the address of a buffer that is
filled by a network receive function and the format of the receive buffer is consistent
with the headers of a published network protocol. The protocol specification is external to our system and not subject to compile-time reordering. Therefore, if τ is
reordered, then τ can no longer be used to reliably access parts of the network buffer.

x¬τ ∗ = A(yτ )
If the righthand-side expression of an assignment3 results in a τ pointer and the
lefthand-side variable is not of type τ -pointer, then τ may not be suitable for field
reordering.
An example of how this operation is potentially unsafe for field reordering is as
follows: suppose the inverse of the previous example listed in Section 4.3.2. Suppose
that the righthand-side expression results in a memory address that is formatted as a
reordered version of type τ and the lefthand-side is expecting a pointer to a region of
memory that specifies network headers to be sent directly on the network, then the
send buffer will be formatted in a way that is inconsistent with the network protocol
and network communication will fail.
2

Our system is designed to protect commodity operating system kernels. As a result, our design is
pertinent to the C programming language specifically.
3
In the source code, an assignment may be manifested in various forms. For example: passing a
variable into a function is an assignment.
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x = A(yτz )
If the righthand-side expression of an assignment3 results in the address of a field
inside of a variable of type τ , then τ may not be suitable for field reordering.
An example of how this operation is potentially unsafe for field reordering is
as follows: suppose that the x is used in the source code to calculate the address
of a sibling field. If the sibling offset address calculation were not aware of the
potential for field reordering, then the calculation would likely be incorrect. It is
worth noting however, that code containing this kind of sibling calculation would
be difficult to maintain considering alignment issues alone. However uncommon, it
remains a possibility.

τ is a member of a union or record
If τ is the type of a member included in a union definition, then τ may not be
suitable for field reordering.
An example of how this use is potentially unsafe for field reordering is as follows:
suppose that a union was constructed with two members τ and ¬τ . Supposed that
τx and ¬τy were the same offset in the union. If τx were relocated at compile time,
then ¬τy would no longer point to the same offset. Additionally, suitability analysis
would have to be performed on all unions that include τ because unsafe casting of
the union may occur.
Similarly, if τ is the type of a field included in anther record, then τ many not be
suitable for field reordering. Suitability analysis would have to be performed on all
records that include τ because unsafe casting may occur.

4.3.3 Subroutine Argument Order Randomization
Similar to RFOR, we have designed our subroutine argument order randomization
technique to occur at compile-time. During compilation we randomize the argument
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Algorithm 2 Subroutine argument order randomization with padding
for all (definitions, types, calls) of S do
a[] ← Sarguments
n ← count of items in a[]
if option to add padding is true then
x ← seeded pseudorandom integer < max and > min
for 1 to x do
if S is definition then
a[] ← new parameter declaration
end if
if S is type then
a[] ← new argument type
end if
if S is call then
a[] ← new call argument
end if
n←n+1
end for
end if
for i = n − 1 down to 1 do
j ← seeded pseudorandom integer ≥ 0 and ≤ i
swap a[j] and a[i]
end for
Sarguments ← a[]
end for
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Input: foo_func(1,2,3);

Caller
Callee
SP+0x8 BP+0x10
SP+0x4 BP+0xc
SP BP+0x8

Reordered

arg 3
arg 2
arg1
ret
svd bp

arg 1
arg 3
arg 2
ret
svd bp

address

BP

Source Order

movl $0x3,0x8(%SP)
movl $0x2,0x4(%SP)
movl $0x1,(%SP)
call <foo_func>

movl
movl
movl
call

$0x1,0x8(%SP)
$0x3,0x4(%SP)
$0x2,(%SP)
<foo_func>

(a)

(b)

Figure 4.2. Subroutine argument order randomization. “SP” represents the stack pointer register. “BP” represents the stack base
pointer register.

order for each definition of, type of, and call to a given subroutine. Also similar to
RFOR, we use a seeded pseudorandomization algorithm so that the same argument
order can be replicated across multiple compilation units.
Our argument order randomization technique takes as input the source code of the
software to be randomized, a set of one or more subroutine names, a set of one or more
randomization seeds, and a set of one or more padding flags. The meaning of each
input is analogous to the RFOR example outlined in Section 4.3.1. Our argument
order randomization technique produces as output a compiled binary.
When a kernel subroutine is reordered using SAOR, attack code compiled, without randomization, against the kernel source code will be incompatible. For example,
regarding the subroutine argument order randomization illustrated in Figure4.2, suppose the attack code made a call to a randomized subroutine. The callee variable that
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holds the first argument will get the value of the malicious callers third parameter.
Similar to RFOR, the results of the malicious code execution are unpredictable.
Not all subroutines are suitable for SAOR. Subroutines that are called using a
function pointer are not randomizable because the caller would not be identified
at compile-time and the call stack would not be correctly reordered. Additionally,
functions with a variable length argument list are likely not randomizable without
modifications to the subroutine logic.
For our evaluation, detailed in Section 4.5, we found that Similar to a system
using RFOR, malicious software failed to run as intended on systems compiled with
SAOR.

4.4 Implementation
To test our design, we implemented three plugins: RFOR, RFOR Fitness, and
SAOR using the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC). GCC versions 4.5 and newer have
the ability to load user-supplied plug-ins during compilation [71]. We leverage this
plug-in architecture to realize our design. Following are the details for each plug-in.

4.4.1 Record Field Order Randomization
The RFOR GCC plugin provides compile-time record offsets randomization. The
GCC plug-in architecture provides an event callback named “PLUGIN FINISH TYPE” that gives us a hook into the compilation process. The PLUGIN FINISH TYPE event occurs after a record or union type specifier has been parsed. The event
data passed to our plugin’s callback function is a pointer to the AST tree node for the
most recently parsed record or union as illustrated in Figure 4.3(b) and (c). We are
only interested in record types. As a result, we ignore events associated with unions.
We implemented two versions of this plug-in. Both versions perform the randomization step in the same way; using the algorithm described in Algorithm 1. To save
the new layout, the pointer fields of each field declaration are updated in the AST as
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Source
struct foo{
int a;
int b;
int c;
};

AST

record_type

AST After Randomization

identifier.id.str

foo

record_type

type.values

identifier.id.str

foo

type.values
field_decl

identifier.id.str

a

field_decl

identifier.id.str

a

identifier.id.str

b

field_decl

identifier.id.str

b

identifier.id.str

c

common.chain

field_decl

common.chain common.chain

common.chain

field_decl

identifier.id.str

c

field_decl

common.chain

NULL

(a)

common.chain
NULL

(b)

(c)

Figure 4.3. AST-based randomization

shown in Figure 4.3(c). The two versions of this plug-in differ only in how the records
are selected for randomization. The first version, variant “A” randomizes all records
encountered except those with the GCC attribute “noreorder” set in the source code,
e.g. “ attribute

((noreorder))”.

The second version, variant “B” randomizes only the records provided by name
on the command line. The plug-in and its argument are provided by the user as
GCC command line flags. The plug-in accepts multiple arguments, one argument for
each target record name. All records of the same name will be randomized because
the name is not necessarily unique across all compilation units. The randomization
happens at type definition time and therefore applies to all instances of the record.
In addition to standard randomization, our plug-in allows the user to specify a
boolean flag for each target record that indicates whether or not the record should
be padded with bogus members. If yes, our plug-in adds a random number of bogus
fields to the target record or records.

4 bytes
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Packed

Aligned

Reordered

char
char

char
char

char

padding

padding

integer
integer
integer

10 bytes

integer

char
integer

padding

12 bytes
integer

16 bytes
(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 4.4. Record size variation

The total record size may change as a side effect of field reordering as illustrated
in Figure 4.4. Notice that Figure 4.4(c) is a reordering of fields found in (b). If a
record is not “packed,” then the compiler may align fields for efficiency. One common
optimization is for the compiler to align field offsets on word boundaries as shown in
(b) and (c). If a record is packed, as in Figure 4.4(a) the record will always take up
the minimal amount of memory and the total record size will not change as a result
of randomization.
Our initial implementation performed randomization after the entire compilation unit had been parsed but prior to optimization passes (PLUGIN PRE GENERICIZE). We observed that if the size of the record changed as a result of randomization, then some compile-time calculations such as “sizeof” were incorrect. Also
affected was offsetof ( builtin offsetof) calculations that we later discovered was an
essential calculation for common Linux kernel data structures such as “list.” GCC,
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folds the result of sizeof into a constant during parsing and leaves no indication that
the constant was a result of the sizeof calculation. As a result, there was no reliable
way for us to find the constant in the AST to update it. To remedy this problem, we
moved the randomization procedure to the PLUGIN FINISH TYPE event as previously described. This event happens after the record definition is parsed but before
it is an argument to sizeof and other similar compiler functions.
struct
int
int
#ifdef
int
#endif
int
};

foo {
a;
b;
BAR
x;
c;

Designated
struct foo x =
{
.a = 1,
.b = 2,
.c = 3,
};

(a)

Undesignated
struct foo x =
{1, 2, 3};

(b)

Figure 4.5. Variable initializers

We discovered that this early randomization approach fixed size-related calculations but broke non-designated variable initializers. Figure 4.5 illustrates the difference between initializers. Currently, this is the only known limitation of our plug-in.
The problem is that when a non-designated initializer is parsed, the compiler assumes
that the source-code-order of values matches the source-code-order of the record members. This problem could be solved by modifying the way GCC stores initializers in
the AST. Simply adding a node attribute that indicates how the initializer was formed
would solve the problem. However, we discovered that, for the tested kernel records,
non-designated initializers were not used. The reason for this is shown in the Figure 4.5. If the macro BAR is defined, then (b) would be an invalid initializer assuming
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that the programmer was intending to assign the value 3 to field c and not x. However, with or without defining BAR, initializer (a) would assign values correctly. Our
static analysis tool, described in Section 4.4.2, reports when and if the target record
is declared with an initializer.
GCC permits an incomplete variable type, such as a flexible array, to be positioned
as the last field of a record. Therefore, if the last element is an incomplete type, it
cannot be moved during randomization. Our plug-in handles this situation by pinning
the last field to the last position when the field type is incomplete.

4.4.2 RFOR Fitness Check
The RFOR Fitness Check GCC plug-in is a static analysis tool for determining
the fitness of a candidate record for randomization by inspecting the abstract syntax
tree during compilation. The inspection occurs after parsing has been completed but
prior to optimization passes.
Again we leverage the GCC plug-in architecture callback event “PLUGIN PRE GENERICIZE” to do most of the work. The callback associated with this event
received the function definition (FUNCTION DECL) of the most recently parsed
function definition. From this root node we traverse the tree using the API functioned
named “walk tree().” One of the parameters to walk tree is a callback function name.
Our callback function checks for four kinds of nodes: NOP EXPR, CALL EXPR,
ADDR EXPR, and CONVERT EXPR.
A NOP EXPR node represents, among other things, a cast of one type to another.
Figure 4.6 shows the case where a pointer to a record is cast from another type. This
case would be reported by our tool. We can use the NOP EXPR to find the cases
where memory is cast to or from a pointer to the type of the target record. If the
target record for analysis was of type foo as shown in the figure, then we check to
see if the left-hand side of the cast is a pointer to a variable of type foo by checking
the corresponding nodes of the AST. If the right-hand side of the modify expression
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Input: x = (struct foo *) y;
@12:modify_expr

op 0

@3:var_decl

name

@6:identifier_node
x

op 1

@19:nop_expr

type

type

type

@7:pointer_type

op 0

@30:var_decl

ptd

name

@15:record_type

@37:identifier_node
y

type

@38:pointer_type

name

ptd

@21:identifier_node
foo

@2:void_type

Figure 4.6. AST of a cast from one pointer type to another

is not also a pointer to a variable of type foo, then our plug-in reports this case as a
potentially unsafe operation.
GCC does not allow for direct assignment from one record type to another even
if both records have the same layout4 . Similarly, GCC does not allow for coerced
assignment from one record type to another using a cast5 . Therefore, all unsafe
assignments to/from a record type will be pointer casts using the NOP EXPR. Our
first two cases: x¬τ ∗ = A(yτ ) and x = A(yτz ) are therefore tested when a NOP EXPR
is encountered in the AST.
4
5

error: incompatible types when assigning to type
error: conversion to non-scalar type requested
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The third case: x = A(yτz ) is tested also during the PLUGIN PRE GENERICIZE
event. We have developed two detection mechanisms for this case. The first is the
more straight-forward and conservative approach. When an ADDR EXPR is encountered we check the operand. If the operand of the address expression is the field of
a target record, then we report the instance. The second implementation of this
test is similar, however we only report the instance if the ADDR EXPR is part of a
CONVERT EXPR and the address is immediately converted to an integer. In this
case the the ADDR EXPR is a child node to the CONVERT EXPR so we ignore
ADDR EXPR and check the operand of all instances of CONVERT EXPR. If the
type of the convert expression is INTEGER, then we report the instance. More information about the motivation for this optional refinement is described in the evaluation
Section 4.5.2.
Often, a record field is passed by address to a function. As described in Section 4.3.2, taking the address of a field and then using it to calculate the address
offset of a sibling field is an unlikely occurrence. An even more unlikely occurrence is
for such a calculation to be performed on the address of an argument to a function.
Therefore, our evaluation ignores cases when a field address is taken in the context of
a call parameter. To detect such occurrences, we collect all call parameters during the
PLUGIN PRE GENERICIZE event that are pointers to fields of the target record
type. Then later during AST tree traversal, when the address is taken of the field,
the ADDR EXPR corresponding to call parameters are not reported.
The fourth and final case, the case when the target record is nested inside of
a union or record, is tested when the compiler event PLUGIN FINISH TYPE is
encountered. The event data received is a finished type node. For our purpose we
ignore all types except RECORD TYPE and UNION TYPE. Each type contains a
set of FIELD DECL nodes. We iterate over each field declaration and check the type.
If the target type is found in a FIELD DECL, the instance is reported as a potentially
unsafe condition.
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As mentioned in Section 4.4.1, non-designated variable initializers are not compatible with field reordering. This is an implementation limitation. Therefore, as part
of our fitness analysis, we report when initializers are used for the target record type.
We use the PLUGIN FINISH DECL event to check for such cases. Unfortunately,
by the time the PLUGIN FINISH DECL event occurs the initializers has already
been parsed into its final form in the AST. At this point, from the AST perspective,
a non-designated initializer is structured the same as a designated initializer. As a
result, we report all instances where the target record is initialized. As previously
described, a modification to GCC proper could remedy this situation by classifying
the initializer nodes as either designated or non-designated in the AST.

4.4.3 Subroutine Argument Order Randomization
The SAOR GCC plugin provides compile-time subroutine argument order randomization. The GCC plug-in architecture provides two callback events that we leverage
for this plugin named “PLUGIN PRE GENERICIZE” and “PLUGIN OVERRIDE GATE.” We introduced the former in Section 4.4.1. The event data passed to our
plug-in’s callback function is a pointer to the AST tree node for the most recently
parsed function definition. The latter event, PLUGIN OVERRIDE GATE, occurs
many times during optimization passes. However, we are only interested in the first
occurrence. The first occurrence happens before optimization but after all PLUGIN PRE GENERICIZE events.

Randomize Call Expression Arguments
When a PLUGIN PRE GENERICIZE event occurs, we traverse the function definition’s AST and inspect all call expressions. If the target of the call expression is a
function targeted by randomization, then we reorder the call arguments. Because the
call expression is allocated with a static number of arguments and to support adding
bogus call parameters, we must build a new call expression with the new arguments
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using the API function named “build call array loc.” Once we build the new call
expression we replace the original with the new one in the AST.
Also during the PLUGIN PRE GENERICIZE event, we capture the unique identifier for the completed function definition if the function is a target for SAOR. This
identifier is used later for definition and type randomization. We discovered that we
must randomize all of the call expressions prior to randomizing the function definition and type. Otherwise, if bogus fields were added to the definition, then the parser
would complain when a corresponding call expression was parsed because the source
code would not contain enough parameters; we cannot fix the call expression until
after it has been parsed into an AST.

Randomize Function Definition and Type
The PLUGIN OVERRIDE GATE occurs after all functions have been parsed into
the AST. The difference between this event and PLUGIN PRE GENERICIZE is
that the latter occurs after each function is parsed. Therefore at the time that the
PLUGIN OVERRIDE GATE event occurs our AST is in an inconsistent state. All
calls to target functions have been randomized however, the function definition and
type has not yet been randomized. Recall from the previous section that we had to
delay randomizing these components until after all calls have been parsed to avoid
compilation errors.
We collected the AST unique identifier for each of the completed target function
definitions previously during the PLUGIN PRE GENERICIZE event. Now we iterate
over that list of targeted function definitions and randomize the definition as well as
the associated type for each.
Reordering the arguments for both the definition and the type was similar to
RFOR randomization illustrated in Figure 4.3. We obtained parameter declaration head list node and the argument type head list node from the GCC macros
DECL ARGUMENTS and TYPE ARG TYPES. Using the algorithm described in
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Algorithm 2, we shuffled each list by updating the next pointer of each element.
For the type, we used the function GCC build function type to reinitialize the type
attributes.

4.5 Evaluation
We performed our evaluation on a 2.30GHz four core Intel R CoreTM i5-2410M
CPU with 8 GB of RAM running 32 bit Fedora (15), Linux (2.6.38.6-26), and GCC
(Red Hat 4.6.3-2). Our experiments were performed in KVM/QEMU (0.14) virtual
machines with 1024 M of memory allocated for each.

4.5.1 Security Benefits
To evaluate the security benefits of record field order randomization, we employed
our RFOR plug-in to compile two different Linux kernel versions, 2.6.26 and 3.36 , and
attempted to run four kernel rootkits against the protected system.
Kernel rootkits in the wild are kernel version-sensitive. As a result, two of the
tested rootkits were rewritten to be compatible with our test systems using the principles outlined in the original work. The hidefile rootkit is based on [72]. The hideproc
rootkit is based on [73]. The other two rootkits Adore-NG and hp were used in their
original form with few compatibility modifications.
One cannot compile Linux kernel versions less than 2.6 with GCC version 4 or
greater. The plug-in architecture was not introduced in GCC until version 4.5. As a
result, the oldest kernel that we were able to randomize was 2.6.26 using GCC 4.7.3
and our RFOR plugin. We were able to test the adore-ng rootkit against this version
of the Linux kernel.
We identified five security sensitive records in the Linux kernel based, in-part,
on previous work: task struct, module, file, proc dir entry and inode operations [74].
We compiled our test kernels using variant B of our RFOR plug-in and specifying,
6

We used Fedora’s custom version 2.6.43.8-1 that is a patched version of vanilla kernel 3.3
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depending on the experiment, some subset of the five security-sensitive records as
inputs (with no padding added).
All of the tested rootkits were introduced into the kernel as kernel modules. As a
result, randomizing a single record type named “module” defeated all tested rootkits
before they were loaded into the kernel. The specific failure was that the module
loading procedure could not find the module’s name in the attacker-provided module
struct.
It is possible for malicious kernel code to be introduced through means other
loadable kernel modules [1]. We performed some further experiments without randomizing the “module” record type to test our protection mechanism against rootkit
behaviors. We found that if we randomize the record type named “task struct,” we
prevent hp, adore-ng, hideproc from hiding system processes. If we randomize the
record type named “module,” we prevent hidefile from hiding system files.
Similar to our evaluation of RFOR, to evaluate the security benefits of subroutine
argument order randomization, we employed our SAOR plug-in to compile Linux
kernel version 3.2.46 with all calls-to, declarations-of, and types named “pid task”
randomized. This kernel subroutine returns the corresponding task struct for a given
process identifier (PID). We then attempted to use the hp rootkit against this kernel.
The hp rootkit was not able to hide a process as a result of SAOR randomization.
Though the rootkit loaded successfully into kernel space, its payload was neutralized.

4.5.2 Randomizability Analysis
We used our RFOR Fitness plugin to test the suitability of the record type
“task struct” for randomization. For each potentially unsafe condition found in the
source code, our plugin emits a warning message complete with file name and line
number7 .
7

In some cases an approximate location is provided.
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For our experiments we compiled the Linux kernel version linux-2.6.38.8 using our
RFOR Fitness plug-in with “task struct” as an argument and the linuxconf configuration template named “allnoconfig.”
The plug-in reported that there were 312 conditions found in the kernel source
code that may disqualify task struct from randomization. After careful analysis we
found that many of the cases were not actually a problem for randomization and
could be automatically detected. We discovered that we could employ whitelists to
reduce the total number of false-positive. Following is a list of heuristics that we
used to create the whitelists. These heuristics are provided as an aid to analysis. The
specifics, e.g. function names and types, will vary from system to system. The RFOR
Fitness plug-in results for task struct both with and without whitelists are provided
in Table 4.1.

Generics
Often large code bases provide a reusable set of generic types, macros, and functions that implement common data structures such as lists and queues. These data
structures can be reused for a variety of types. For example, the Linux process list is
a list of task structs. The same list implementation used for processes, can be used
to create other kinds of lists. To allow the list to hold multiple types, at some point
the type will be untyped and cast as a generic list member. This casting trips the
assignment to/from τ ∗ condition.
We found that we could whitelist specific Linux types and drastically reduce
the number of conditions reported by the RFOR Fitness plug-in. Specifically we
whitelisted the following pointer types for assignment: list head, hlist node, rcu head,
plist node, sched entity, sched rt entity,

wait queue.private, raw spinlock.owner,

mid q entry.callback data. Additionally, we whitelisted the function named
heap insert8 .
8

Many data structure operations were macros. This function was an exception.
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In addition to generic data structures, there were three generic error-related functions we determined to be safe for field reordering. Specifically we whitelisted the
following functions: IS ERR, PTR ERR and ERR PTR.

Memory Allocation Functions
When memory is dynamically allocated the raw memory begins untyped and is
cast as a type. The assignment of this untyped memory to a τ ∗ is reported by our
RFOR Fitness plug-in. We found that we could whitelist specific Linux memory allocation function and reduce the number of conditions reported by the RFOR Fitness
plug-in. Specifically we whitelisted all of the malloc functions detected automatically
by GCC using the DECL IS MALLOC macro in addition to the kmem cache alloc
and kmem cache free functions.

Address of Field Conversion
Our plugin reports when the address of a field of τ is taken. This is a frequent
occurrence. As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, this is likely not problematic for field reordering. However, our plug-in detects the condition. To aid in analysis, we whitelist
the condition where the address of the field is taken but not immediately converted
into an integer.
The problematic case for field reordering is when the address of a field is used to
calculate the relative position of a sibling field. To do this math, the address would
have to be converted into an integer eventually. Again we emphasize that this kind of
calculation has not been observed in source code, is difficult to get correct because of
compile-time field realignment, and would make the source code difficult to maintain;
yet, it remains a possibility. Our plug-in can be configured to report all instances if
desired.
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Table 4.1
RFOR Fitness Report for task struct
Test

W/O Whitelists

W/ Whitelists

Assignment To task struct *

52

1

Assignment From task struct *

46

2

Address Taken of task struct Field

214

0

312

3
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Table 4.2
Performance impact of RFOR
Phoronix Benchmark

w/o RFOR

w/ RFOR

Gzip Compression

36.12s

35.97s

Timed ImageMagick Compilation

231.14s

232.46s

Table 4.3
Time to compile kernel
Options

Avg Time

w/o Plug-Ins

86.730s

w/ RFOR Plugin

87.9087s

w/ Fitness Plugin

87.2170s

w/ SAOR Plugin

87.8303s

4.5.3 Performance
We used the Phoronix test suite to measure the system performance both with
and without the record randomization.The results are shown in Table 4.2. With a
single record randomized, task struct, randomization has no observable performance
impact.
To test the performance impact of our compiler plug-in’s on compilation time,
we used the “time” command to measure compilation time with each plug-in. For
each test we compiled a minimal Linux kernel version 2.6.38.8 using the configuration
template named “allnoconfig.” We ran each compilation test three times and calculated the average. The percentage increase of compilation time was between 0.5%
and 1.35%. The average results are shown in Table 4.39 .
9

For our tests, task struct was not nested in a union therefore the related test results are excluded
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4.6 Discussion
The record field-order randomization suitability analysis method described in Section 4.3.2 applies directly to the C programming language. C is the primary language
used for commodity operating system kernels (NT, XNU and Linux). Kernels written
in a different programming language may use additional language features that are
incompatible with field order randomization.
The conservative static RFOR suitability analysis technique described in Section 4.3.2 is likely to report false-positives, that a record type is not randomizable
when in actuality it is safe for randomization. We introduced a heuristics based approach in Section 4.5.2 to aid in analysis of the the Linux kernel specifically. This
approach could be refined and made more general by adding pointer analysis.
We assume that the rules described in Section 4.3.2 are comprehensive for RFOR
suitability analysis. Our analysis of source code, survey of the literature including [70],
and experimentation leads us to the conclude that the ruleset is complete. If our
ruleset is incomplete, RFOR suitability analysis would omit conditions that should
be reported (false-negatives).
According to the C11 standard, a single structure may have at most 1023 members
and a single function definition may have at most 127 parameters [75]. To conform
to the standard and the capabilities of standards-compliant compilers, RFOR and
SAOR may not add counterfeit padding that exceeds these limits. This reduces,
particularly in the case of SAOR, the total number of permutations possible for
each randomization technique. These limitations therefore reduce the efficacy of our
techniques against brute-force attack.
Many architectures including ARM, X86-64, MIPS and SPARC have argument
registers; function arguments may be store in processor registers rather than on the
stack. Figure 4.2 illustrates a stack-based argument passing paradigm. However, the
design of SAOR is not dependent on stack-based argument passing because reordering
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occurs in the AST and yielded machine code will be reordered regardless of the
argument storage paradigm.
If an attacker were to gain access to the randomized executable file or to the randomized binary image in memory, he may be able to reverse engineer the randomized
layout order and use the information to customize an attack. Randomized program
files should be protected. Additionally, special memory devices, such as /dev/kmem
on Linux, should be disabled and other kernel protection mechanism, such as those
described in Chapter 3 should be employed to protect the in-memory randomized
code.
Our randomization techniques likely have other benefits not addressed herein. For
example, similar to our minimization technique, described in Chapter 5, randomization may assist in protecting systems against ROP attacks. ROP attacks depend
considerably on the memory layout of the victim programs. If the program is randomized using our techniques, then ROP attacks may be subverted.
Both randomization techniques may complicate program debugging. If debug information is included in the yielded executable file, the debugging information will
correspond to either the randomized layout or the unrandomized source-order layout.
In the former situation, the debugging information could potentially be used by an
attacker to acquire information about the layout. In the latter situation, the debugging information would be incorrect. For our implementation, if debug information
is stored, it is stored prior to layout randomization.

4.7 Summary
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that memory layout randomization is an
effective defense against kernel rootkits and that these compile-time techniques incur
no run-time overhead making them suitable for even low-powered devices. Further,
we have demonstrated that our static analysis technique is an effective way to automatically determine the suitability of a record for field order randomization.
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5 ENSURING THE MINIMALITY OF INCLUDED KERNEL COMPONENTS
5.1 Introduction
Code injection prevention and authentication techniques, such as those described
in Chapter 3, are still vulnerable to return and jump oriented programming (ROP and
JOP respectively) attacks because the payload executable code is already present in
kernel memory. The instructions are merely reused in unintended and malicious ways.
With large commodity operating system, the amount of reusable code is abundant.
As described by Bryant et. al. in their work on Poly2 , the operating system
kernel often includes code that is unnecessary for the applications that are running
on the system [54]. General-purpose operating system vendors include kernel code
for many possible hardware profiles and system use cases to cover the most uses with
a single piece of software. Though this makes the kernel executable larger, it reduces
the number of versions that the vendor must support and update. This extra code,
though perhaps convenient for both end-users and vendors is a security liability.
The seminal work on return-oriented programming is titled, in-part, “innocent
flesh on the bone,” a crude reference to the code flesh left on the bone, the kernel in
our case, and available for devouring by attackers [3]. In Poly2 , researchers remove
unnecessary code at compile time. Though there has been work done in adding code
to a kernel at run-time, such as loadable kernel modules, there has not been work
done in removing code from a kernel at run-time. In our work we intend to garner the
benefits of the kernel reduction technique described in Poly2 at run-time and reduce
the vulnerability of commodity operating system kernels.
Our hypothesis is that it is possible to improve the security of a kernel against
return and jump oriented programming attacks by deactivating extraneous kernel
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code at run-time, thereby limiting the supply of reusable instructions that can be
used to construct return-oriented gadgets.
To test our hypothesis, we introduce two novel techniques for run-time kernel
minimization. The first is an out-of-the-box function eviction technique. The second
is a kernel-based non-executable page technique. We implement a prototype for the
out-of-the-box technique and report the results.

5.2 Related Work
Work has been done in design-time techniques for minimizing the code contained
in a kernel. Minix and Mach are microkernel designs that attempt to include only
necessary components in the kernel space [50, 76].
Work has been done in compile-time techniques for reducing the code contained
in a kernel. In the Poly2 framework, kernels are minimized at compile-time based on
the kernel mechanisms needed for specific applications to improve security [54]. For
the operating system family named Choices, the kernel is minimized at compile-time
based on the functions needed for a specific embedded system to make the kernel as
small as possible [55].
Work has been done in run-time techniques for optimizing the code contained in a
kernel. The Synthesis kernel optimizes system functions at run-time that get reused
frequently to improve system performance [77].

5.3 Chapter Organization
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: we begin in Section 5.4 by
laying out the design of our minimization techniques followed by a description of our
KIS implementation in Section 5.5. In Section 5.6, we evaluate the security merits of
our approaches. Finally, in Section 4.7, we summarize our contributions and findings.
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5.4 Design
5.4.1 Problem
Modern commodity operating systems are equipped with monolithic kernels that,
by design, contain code that does not strictly need kernel-level privileges. Since 1991
the Linux kernel has grown in size from 10,000 lines of code (LOC) to 15,004,006 LOC
in 2012. From 2010 to 2012 it more than doubled in size. Likewise, the Windows NT
Kernel has 50 million LOC by some estimates 1 . This excessive code increases the
risk of kernel-level exploitation.
We are motivated to reduce this risk by dynamically applying the economy of
mechanism to the operating system kernel code; to prune the kernel back to the
minimum amount of instructions that are required for each specific system use case
and hardware configuration at run-time. To keep with the carnivorous analogy, we
intend to remove as much kernel flesh from the bone as possible. We refer to this
technique as run-time kernel minimization.

5.4.2 Approach
In this section we describe the general approach to run-time kernel minimization.
We introduce a run-time kernel specialization security monitor named KIS. KIS is
an acronym borrowed, in-part, from a common design principle named KISS that
stands for “keep it simple, stupid.” The economy of mechanism security principle
can be described colloquially as the KISS principle. For our use, KIS stands for
“kernel instructions specialization” and “keep it simple.” KIS is the mechanism that
deactivates and activates code at run-time.
1

http://www.knowing.net/index.php/2005/12/06/how-many-lines-of-code-in-windows/
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Code Deactivation
We have devised two general techniques for deactivating instructions at run-time.
The first is function-level code deactivation. The second is page-level code deactivation.
The function-level deactivation technique modifies kernel functions that are resident in memory. Offline, the kernel is analyzed and a profile is generated. The profile
is a list of pairs. The first element in each pair is the address of a kernel function.
The second element in each pair is the size of the function in bytes. Each pair can be
used to define the byte range of every kernel function.
Online, after the kernel has been loaded into memory, for each function that must
be deactivated, we will refer to these functions as mutant functions. KIS replaces
the mutant function body with alternative instructions. The form of the alternative
instructions depends on whether or not the mutant function can be restored to its
original. If the mutant function must never be restored, then the mutant function
may be filled with a return instruction, a NOP sled, and a final return instruction.
If instructions are fetched from anywhere in the mutant function, execution will immediately return to the caller. Depending on the callee-caller contract, some register
restoring may also be necessary. As described in [18], the return value of “-1” can be
used as an impostor return value that is handled by some caller code. If the mutant
function should truly never be used by the system, then the mutant function will
never be called legitimately and illegitimate calls will fail gracefully in many cases.
If mutant function restoration is allowed, then the mutant body is replaced with
an interrupt instruction (INT3) or series of interrupt instructions that, if executed,
would pass control to an interrupt handler. In the case that KIS is located “out of
the box” in a hypervisor, the interrupt would be raised to the hypervisor first and
KIS could manage the restoration of the mutant. In the case that KIS is located in
the kernel, KIS would have to be installed as an interrupt handler.
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In both cases, KIS removes the original mutant function bodies. Any returnoriented programming attacks that rely on the original mutant body will hampered,
if not completely prevented.
The second code deactivation technique is similar to the NICKLE-KVM approach
described in Chapter 3. Rather than deactivating the code at the function-level, we
deactivate code at the page-level. If a page contains code that must be deactivated,
we call this a mutant page, then the corresponding page table entry is set to nonexecutable. If instructions located in that page are fetched, control would then be
passed to KIS by way of a page fault exception.
Because the page-level deactivation is less granular than the function-level technique previously described, special consideration must be given to pages that contain
both code that should be executable and code that should not be executable. If such
mixed pages exist, they should likely remain executable. If KIS is located in the hypervisor, then the mixed mutant pages may be set non-executable. This would reduce
the size of the kernel until the page-adjacent approved code was activated thereby
activating the excessive code at the same time.
The Poly2 approach is to remove unnecessary code once and never reintroduce
it. This occurs at compile time. If an analogous run-time approach is used, then we
would need to calculate offline the kernel code required by the applications that will
be running on the system and deactivate the unneeded instructions at run-time. An
alternative approach is to deactivate code liberally, leaving only essential components
activated, and reactivate code on an as-needed basis. Deciding what code to reactivate
is described later.

KIS Security Monitor
The purpose of the security monitor is to deactivate and reactivate code and log
related events. KIS may be activated by system exceptions such as a page fault or
debug interrupt previously described or by a message passing. Additionally, it may
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itself be monitoring the system for specific conditions and trigger code to be activated
or deactivated based on predefined events.
The security monitor can be used passively for anomaly detection. If the deactivated code should not be executed but is, then the event is logged and used as part of
an intrusion detection analysis. It is passive in that, in this mode, it has a permissive
re-inclusion policy that allows for the code to be reactivated. In this mode KIS would
act primarily as a detection mechanism rather than a prevention mechanism.
KIS may also take a more active role. If the deactivated code should not be
executed but is, then the event is logged and used as part of an intrusion detection
analysis. If no reactivation policy is available, then KIS would terminate the process.
If a reactivation policy is available that permits reactivation, then the security monitor
reactivates the code.
Various deactivation/reactivation policies may be constructed. We have devised
two examples of such policies. The first is based on an event model; the second on a
control flow graph technique such as the one described by [35].
One example of an event driven policy is the following: for a kernel that supports
LKM, at system boot many modules are loaded automatically to service the hardware
present in the system. Suppose that this system is a server system in a data center
that never needs any new hardware hot-plugged. Once the system is booted, the
module loading code can be deactivated. A “modules loaded” message could be
passed to KIS or KIS could be configured to detect that event and deactivate the
module loading code.
A second example of a reactivation policy is on-demand activation. Suppose that
after system boot-up is complete all non-essential kernel code is deactivated. The code
is then reactivated on an as-needed basis. A permissive approach is to reactivate code
on-demand. In this scenario, KIS verifies that the first instruction fetched from the
mutant, function or page, is the first instruction byte of a function body.
Though permissive, this is a minimally intrusive approach that allows the system
to run nearly unfettered while still preventing ROP and JOP attacks from reusing
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instructions originally found in the mutants. In the case that the kernel memory
is not visible to the attacker, for example /dev/kmem access is prevented in the
Linux kernel, then the ROP and JOP attacks would be formulated against the offline
version of the kernel code, the code that contains all of the original mutant function
instructions. Online, any attack that depends on a mutant instruction would fail.
This approach is described further and evaluated in Sections 5.5 and 5.6.
The previously described permissive on-demand activation policy can be constrained further using control-flow analysis. Offline, a control-flow graph is generated
for the kernel. The graph describes all parent-child relationships between code regions and all valid control flow entry points. For example, if code is deactivated at
the function level, then the first time that code is fetched, it should be on a function
boundary and at least one parent function should already be activated. If the code is
deactivate at the page level, then the entry control-flow validation would work similarly. However, for code that crosses page boundaries, additional entry points would
be required.

KIS Location
The kernel is intended to run with all of its instructions intact. If essential instructions are removed, then a kernel fault will likely destabilize if not destroy the
kernel operation. If, for example, KIS is placed in the system kernel, the page fault
interrupt handler must be able to service page faults at all times. If KIS is placed
outside of the system and code may be reactivated on demand, then the number of
essential components may be minimal.
Out-of-the-box security mechanisms, such as those described in Chapter 3, are
tamper-resistant against guest-based attacks. In-kernel security mechanisms are subject to vulnerabilities of the kernel that it is trying to protect. In situations where
virtualization is is used, such as in a cloud hosting environment, KIS should be located in the hypervisor for maximum security benefits. However, in situations where
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virtualization is not appropriate, such as resource constrained mobile devices, KIS
should be located in the kernel.
Out-of-the-box security mechanisms must be designed carefully as not to impose
too many virtual machine exits (VM exits). VM exits are computationally expensive.
One advantage to an in-kernel KIS design is that it can be more intrusive and code
can be deactivated on a per process basis.
For example, consider the following process-level deactivation scenario. Suppose
a sandboxed shell process (SSHELL) is used for launching all processes subjected to
kernel minimization. The SSHELL has all non-essential kernel code pages marked as
non-executable. When a process is created via a fork, the virtual memory page table
is copied but the physical memory is not, thereby propagating the non-executable
kernel code pages to all child processes. The KIS-enabled kernel has a modified pagefault handler. When an instruction is fetched from a mutant page, the KIS-assisted
page-fault handler will detect if the fault was caused by an NX permissions violation.
If so, then KIS will determine whether or not to allow the page to be reactivated based
on some previously described reactivation policy. If allowed, then the mutant page is
reactivated and the page table entry is set to executable for the duration of the process
and all spawned processes. All processes, such as threads and spawned processes, that
share this process’s page table have the same activated kernel code. Unlike previously
described designs, including Poly2 that are system-level, this design is process-level;
though the kernel is mapped into each process, SSHELL ancestor processes will not
have access to all of the kernel code.

5.5 Implementation
We implemented our run-time kernel minimization security monitor, KIS, using an
Intel i5-2410M 2.30GHz processor. Both our host and guest systems run an unmodified
version of Ubuntu (11.04 2.6.38-8-generic). The host runs the 64 bit version of Ubuntu
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(x86 64) and the guest runs the 32 bit version (i686). We added our security monitor
to the Linux Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM) version kvm-kmod-2.6.38-rc7.
Our run-time kernel minimization implementation closely resembles the permissive on-demand method described previously in Section 5.4.2. KIS is placed in a
Linux KVM hypervisor and protects a single guest running as a QEMU/KVM virtual machine. Guest instructions are deactivated at the function level. Functions are
reactivated when its first function instruction is executed. Though this technique is
permissive, it prevents ROP and JOP that reuse instructions directly preceding freebranch instructions such as return instructions. Such instructions, that are suitable
for reuse, do not occur in the function preamble. As a result ROP and JOP gadgets
will not naturally trigger on-demand function activation.
KIS uses virtual machine introspection to intercept specific guest events. The
first event intercepted is the completion of system startup. For the Linux kernel, we
purposefully chose a point in the boot sequence when the kernel is fully loaded into
memory and has already patched itself. This occurs right before the kernel function
named init post is executed. We refer to this event as the INIT event. The functions
that are executed prior to the INIT event are not protected. Many of those functions
are part of the ELF file section named .init.text and are deallocated shortly after
booting completes and are therefore likely not part of an ROP/JOP attack.
When the INIT event occurs, our security monitor takes control. It reaches into
the virtual machine and deactivates all kernel functions. To deactivate functions it
replaces the first byte of every function with a INT3 byte (0xCC). When the INT3
byte is executed by the guest at some later time, it causes a software interrupt to
occur. This interrupt is raised to the hypervisor and our security monitor handles
the interrupt. If the interrupt is caused by the first byte of a function, then the
original byte is replaced. Because INT3 is an interrupt and not an exception, when
the virtual machine resumes, it tries the instruction again. This time however, the
original instruction is in place and the function executes normally. For this prototype
the function remains activated for the duration of the system.
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5.6 Evaluation
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Figure 5.1. Reactivation of functions over time (log scale)

To evaluate our design, we configured the protected guest with a common LAMP
web server stack (Linux, Apache, MySQL, and PHP). We installed all of these packages from the Ubuntu packaging system. To emulate common usage, we configured
and installed a popular blogging web application named WordPress and configured
all relevant LAMP modules.
After configuring the web server, we rebooted the system with KIS protection
enabled. At boot, KIS disabled 28,828 kernel functions, and 94% of the functions that
were eventually reactivated were activated within the first 1 minute after deactivation.
We allowed the web server to run for 39 hours. Upon shutdown, 160 functions were
activated. A plot of these numbers is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
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Of the 28,828 functions deactivate, only 6,309 were reactivated. 78% of the kernel
functions were not needed by this web server workload. 72% of the instruction bytes
were not needed by this web server workload. KIS can therefore effectively remove
nearly 3/4 of the instructions that could be reused by ROP and JOP attacks.
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Figure 5.2. KIS keeps it simple

To evaluate the effectiveness of KIS against attack, we used an ROP exploitation
tool named ROPgadget v4.0.3 [78]. ROPgadget found 92 reusable gadgets in the
Linux kernel ELF file (vmlinux-2.6.38-8-generic). For our evaluation, with 6,309
kernel functions activated, KIS would prevent 69.56% of the gadgets from executing.
Any attack that depends on one of the 64 deactivated gadgets will fail to run on our
web server’s kernel. Figure 5.2 illustrates these numbers.

5.7 Discussion
The on-demand function activation technique described in Sections 5.4.2 and 5.5
assumes that all valid calls to a function, set the program counter to the address of the
first instruction byte for the function. As a result features such as function nesting, a
non-standard C feature found in GCC, are not supported unless the parent function
is first activated [75]. Similarly, according to the C standard, nonlocal jumps from
a callee function are permitted when the jump destination is located in the calling
function. If C programming standards are followed, the target function of a nonlocal
jump will have already been previously activated. It is possible however, that valid
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machine code could be created that defies our assumptions and that valid programs
would be prevented from executing as intended as a result of KIS.
We have demonstrated that it is possible to reduce the kernel code significantly
for one specific well-defined workload. We have demonstrated that for this specific
workload and for one known set of ROP exploits, that kernel security is improved.
It is possible that some workloads will activate significantly more of the kernel code.
It is also possible that other ROP techniques may produce significantly more attack
possibilities.
If an attacker understood and detected the on-demand function activation technique described in Chapter 5, he may be able to directly or indirectly cause valid calls
to a set of functions that contain code segments necessary for a specific return-oriented
attack.

5.8 Summary
We introduced two novel techniques for run-time kernel minimization. We showed
that these techniques can be an effective defense against kernel-based ROP attacks.
Further, we demonstrated that for a common Linux web server workload, the distributed, unmodified Linux kernel tested was far too large; the workload demanded
only 27.17% (by bytes) of the shipped kernel code to run.
Code injection prevention and authentication techniques provide a strong defense
against attacks that require foreign code to run in kernel space. However, these
techniques are insufficient on their own to defend against attacks that reuse existing
kernel code. Combining the former with run-time kernel minimization significantly
improves the security of a commodity operating system kernel.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Summary
In this dissertation we have shown that it is possible to strengthen the defenses of
commodity, general-purpose, computer operating systems by increasing the diversity
of, validating the integrity of, and ensuring the minimality of the included kernel
components without modifying the kernel source code. Such protections can therefore
be added to existing widely-used unmodified operating systems to prevent malicious
software from executing in supervisor mode.

6.1.1 Validation
In Chapter 3 we introduced a novel technique to validate the integrity of unmodified, self-patching, commodity, general-purpose computer operating system kernels.
We implemented a code injection prevention technique that relies upon kernel code
authentication. We discovered that some modern kernels are “self-patching;” the
kernel instructions mutate at run-time. Previous cryptographic hash validation procedures were not able to handle such modifications. In addition to implementing an
out-of-the-box code injection prevention mechanism that takes advantage of hardware
virtualization for significantly increased performance, we designed and implemented
a system that validates the integrity of each instruction introduced by a self-patching
kernel at run-time and demonstrated that patch-level validation correctly permits
valid kernel patches to be applied and rejects patches that are invalid.
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6.1.2 Diversification
In Chapter 4, we introduced a novel technique to increase the diversity of commodity, general-purpose, computer operating system kernels. We introduce a new
method for randomizing the stack layout of function arguments. We refine a previous
technique for record layout randomization by introducing a static analysis technique
for determining the randomizability of a record. We showed that our static analysis
technique is an effective way to automatically determine the suitability of a record
for field order randomization. Additionally, we showed that by strategically selecting
just a few components for randomization, our techniques prevent all tested kernel
rootkits. These compile-time techniques incur no run-time overhead and makes them
suitable for even low-powered devices.

6.1.3 Minimization
In Chapter 5 we introduced a novel technique to ensure the minimality of unmodified, commodity, general-purpose, computer operating systems kernels. We show that
it is possible to improve the security of a standard commodity operating system kernel
against return oriented programming attacks by deactivating extraneous kernel code
at run-time and thereby limiting the supply of reusable instructions that can be used
to construct return-oriented gadgets. We designed and implemented our run-time
kernel minimization and demonstrated that, for a common web server workload, 72%
of the instructions included in the kernel were extraneous and that run-time kernel
minimization reduced the number of ROP usable gadgets found in the kernel by 70%.

6.2 Future Work
Mobile computing is rapidly replacing desktop and server computing. Many of the
techniques described in this dissertation rely upon virtualization. The compile-time
randomization techniques described in Chapter 4 impose no run-time overhead that
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is essential for low-powered devices. To bring these techniques to mobile computing,
we must investigate how to apply the principles discovered to a mobile context. Can
we run a minimal hypervisor on mobile devices? For the mobile devices that rely
heavily upon a Java Virtual Machine (JVM), such as Android, can we reuse the JVM
for code injection prevention, code authentication, and code minimization? In the
case of run-time kernel minimization, can the in-kernel design be used?
We do not believe that general-purpose operating system kernels can continue to
grow at the current rate. It is too risky. The run-time kernel minimization technique
described here is a patching mechanism for large multipurpose kernels. It would be
better to redesign kernels to include a finer-grained code deactivation paradigm that
allows vendors the flexibility to ship one software artifact for many use cases but also
allows the system to keep it simple.
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